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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Calm Air International LP conducted a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) during the summer and fall of 2014. LOSA is a 
proactive safety effort which places trained and calibrated observers in cockpit jumpseats during normal flying operations to 
capture safety-targeted data about how Flight Crews manage the complexities that occur during their flights. 
A Steering Committee made up of Calm Air management and Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) representatives oversaw the 
project throughout its entirety, which began in April 2014 with the first Steering Committee meeting and completed in May 
2015 with the publication of this report. 
Volunteer Observers were selected from line pilot ranks and were trained and calibrated for their duties with support from a 
third party. A data collection tool was used to capture threat and error management (TEM) variables, along with flight 
narratives. A sample of flights was identified in order to capture the range of destinations, environments and aircraft types 
operated by the airline. The decision to allow a LOSA Observer into the flight deck was at the discretion of the Captain – all 
data was captured voluntarily and logged in a secure online database. 
A total of 83 flight sectors were observed during the observation period, capturing 184 threats, 248 errors and 23 undesired 
aircraft states. Observes also conducted a brief questionnaire with flight crews about their thoughts related to specific 
aspects of the operation. 
 
Table 1: LOSA TEM Summary 
 Total Count Mean 
(83 Sectors) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Threats 184 2.22 1.601 
Errors 248 2.99 2.516 
UAS 23 0.28 0.502 
 
Trends in the data identified opportunities for improvement with visual approach briefings and other standard operating 
procedure (SOP) ambiguities as well as vulnerabilities in checklist and briefing practices. Intentional noncompliance was noted 
in areas commonly identified in industry LOSAs. Unstable approaches were logged at a rate consistent with industry 
averages, through no go-arounds were initiated as a result of an unstable approach (all were flown to a landing). Opportunities 
to improve working relationships with other organizational departments were identified, the System Operations Coordination 
Centre (SOCC) and Maintenance in particular. 
The LOSA, though a logistically challenging effort, was seen to be an investment in Flight Operations - a proactive diagnostic 
safety tool to identify strengths and weaknesses within the operation. Many Pilots expressed support for the LOSA process, 
along with their anticipation and expectation that findings will lead to improvement and progress. A list of high-level 
recommendations is offered based on LOSA findings as a guide for future action. 
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GLOSSARY 
A/C Aircraft 
ACM Air Cycle Machine, often referred to as an ‘ACM Pack’. Used for air conditioning. 
ADU Advisory Display Unit (ATR) 
AGL Above Ground Level 
ALPA Air Line Pilots Association 
APM Aircraft Performance Monitor; ATR system that monitors for performance degradation  
 (ice accumulation) 
APU Auxiliary Power Unit 
ASL Above Sea Level 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATIS Automated Terminal Information Service 
CAP Canada Air Pilot 
CARs Canadian Aviation Regulations 
CARS Community Aerodrome Radio Station 
CofG Centre of Gravity 
CRFI Canadian Runway Friction Index 
CRM Crew Resource Management 
CSA Customer Service Agent 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FL Flight Level 
FMC Flight Management Computer 
FMC/FMGC Flight Management Computer/Flight Management Guidance Computer (LOSA coding) 
FMS Flight Management System 
FSS Flight Service Station 
GPU Ground Power Unit 
HDG Heading (Heading Mode – Flight Director) 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System 
Master Caution Visual and Aural Alert to Crew; requires immediate attention but delayed action 
Master Warning Visual and Aural Alert to Crew; required immediate attention and immediate action 
MCP Mode Control Panel 
MCP/FCU Mode Control Panel/Flight Control Unit (LOSA coding) 
NAV Navigation (Navigation Mode – Flight Director) 
NDB Non-Directional Beacon 
NM Nautical Mile 
NOTOC Notification to Captain; designated document for informing crew of Dangerous Goods carried onboard. 
OFP Operational Flight Plan 
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PAPI Precision Approach Path Indicator 
PF Pilot Flying 
PNF Pilot Not Flying 
QRH Quick Reference Handbook 
RNAV Area Navigation; often referred to in context of GPS-based navigation 
SID Standard Instrument Departure Procedure 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
TEM Threat and Error Management 
TOD Top of Descent 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
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INTRODUCTION 
LINE OPERATIONS SAFETY AUDIT (LOSA) 
This report details the process and findings related to a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) conducted at Calm Air during the 
summer and fall of 2014. 
Traditionally, improvements in aviation safety have been the result of a reactive approach. The lessons learned from aircraft 
accident data have contributed to changes in regulations, technology, training and standard operating procedures, though at 
great cost. A limitation of the accident investigation is that it focuses on failure; we have to wait for an accident to occur, and 
then we can learn about how the crew handled the situation. What we do not learn from the accident though is how other 
crews have successfully managed a similar situation (ICAO, 2002). 
Among the contemporary tools of aviation safety management that includes safety reporting and flight data monitoring (FDM) 
programs is the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). The Human Factors Research Project at the University of Texas 
received FAA funding to develop LOSA in the early 1990s as a research effort to assess the transfer of Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) training from the classroom to the flight line (ICAO, 2002). LOSA places expert observers in flight deck 
jumpseats on routine line flight and uses the Threat and Error Management (TEM) model as a framework to collect and 
categorize crew performance data. This data can  be used proactively to provide “a diagnostic snapshot of organizational 
performance [and also provide] a data-driven mechanism for measuring change (Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmreich, 2003, 
p.2) that has the potential to impact nearly all departments in the airline by helping to: 
 Identify threats in the airline’s operating environment 
 Identify threats in the airline’s operating operations 
 Assess the degree of transference of training to the line 
 Check the quality and usability of procedures; 
 Identify design problems in the human-machine interface 
 Understand pilots’ shortcuts and workarounds; 
 Assess safety margins; 
 Provide a baseline for organizational change; and 
 Provide a rationale for the allocation of resources. (FAA, 2006, p.3) 
 
A useful analogy for understanding the premise of LOSA is offered by the original developers: 
“In the most general of terms, LOSA is similar to getting your cholesterol checked during a routine 
examination. The test, usually performed as a preventive measure, provides evidence of risk on having a 
heart attack or other serious health event. The results themselves do not provide a solution but can prompt 
a person to make healthier lifestyle choices. A person might also choose to do nothing and carry on as 
normal. Either way, the person learned something and is responsible for change. LOSA is the same. It 
provides a diagnostic snapshot of safety performance. It uses cockpit observations collected in normal 
operations to provide a profile of safety strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, the onus is on the airline to 
respond to the data and make change if necessary, in order to prevent an incident or accident.” (Klinect et 
al., 2003, p.2) 
While LOSA may be more widely associated as a safety tool used by larger airlines such as Continental Airlines, Alaska 
Airlines, Cathay Pacific Airways, and Air Canada, its application has been successfully demonstrated in a regional airline 
setting (Eames-Brown, 2007). The original developers of LOSA identify 10 key operating characteristics of which, if employed, 
make it a tool that can be applied in most flight operations.  
Discussion about conducting a LOSA at Calm Air began in mid-2013 as a tool to help collect meaningful operational safety 
data within the company’s Safety Management System. To this point, the system had relied heavily on employee-submitted 
incident/hazard reports and proactive suggestions for improvement to assess organizational safety performance – these 
sources are valuable and essential, though they have limitations. 
LOSA was seen as an opportunity to document and assess the defences and vulnerabilities of the airline through the 
experience of the flight crews. By conducting the process in a methodical and disciplined way, the outcome was seen as a 
valid data set of typical Calm Air flights that were representative of daily flight operations, which had credibility with both 
airline management and line pilots alike, and from which data-driven improvements could be made. 
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CALM AIR INTERNATIONAL LP 
Calm Air is an independent regional airline that primarily serves the communities of northern Manitoba and the Kivalliq region 
of Nunavut. The company operates ATR42, ATR72, D328JET and Hawker HS748 aircraft in accordance with Canadian 
Aviation Regulations (CARs) Subpart 705 operations and 
has main bases in Winnipeg, MB and Thompson, MB, 
employing nearly 500 people. Calm Air had been owned 
and operated by its founders until 2009 when it was 
acquired by the Exchange Income Corporation. The parent 
company also owns several other Canadian air operators. 
The airline conducts passenger operations as well as all-
cargo freighter flights. Many aircraft in the ATR 42/72 
fleet can be set to a ‘combi’ configuration to carry large 
amounts of cargo on scheduled passenger flights. 
Freighter operations are normally staged out of Thompson 
or Churchill, MB where the company maintains 
warehouse facilities. ATR freighter aircraft can also be 
configured to carry bulk fuel in an integral tank system to 
re-supply remote communities. 
A breakdown of the Calm Air fleet at the time of the 
LOSA is found below. Since being acquired by the 
Exchange Income Corporation, the flight operation has 
undergone a fleet renewal program that has seen the 
retirement of the Saab 340 fleet and all but one of the 
HS748 fleet and their replacement with ATR42/72 and 
Dornier 328JET aircraft. 
With the exception of the HS748, all aircraft are equipped 
with flight management systems (FMS); the ATR42/72 
use the Universal UNS-1K or UNS-1Lw and the D328JET 
fleet use the Honeywell FMZ series. At the time of the 
LOSA, only the D328JET fleet was authorized to conduct 
non-precision RNAV approach procedures. 
Pilot Group 
At the time of the LOSA, there were 90 pilots listed on 
the Pilot Seniority List, including 4 Management Pilots 
(V.P. Operation, Director, Flight Operations, Chief Pilot and 
Assistant Chief Pilot). The pilot group is represented by the Air 
Line Pilots Association (ALPA). 
Generally speaking, new-hire pilots come to the organization from 
Air Taxi (CAR 703) and (Commuter (CAR 704) flight operations. Pilots conduct initial and annual flight training in full flight 
simulators (ATR42/72 and D328JET), including Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). Annually, they also conduct two days of 
annual aircraft type training and two days of annual company training in the classroom including Crew Resource Management 
(CRM), supplemented with online learning.   
While the organization sees flight crew turnover at along the natural rate in the industry, nearly 70% of line pilots had at least 
5 years of service at the time of the LOSA. Internal research conducted in 2013 showed that the average age of a Calm Air 
pilot was 36 years old (SD=8.07) and that the average length of service with the company was 6.9 years (SD=4.73) (Mitchell, 
2013). 
Table 3: Pilot Aircraft Qualification and Workload (2014) 
Aircraft 
Qualification 
No. of Pilots Average Hours 
Flown/Year (2014) 
Average Days  
Worked (2014) 
ATR42/72 65 635.9 178.4 
D328JET 17 592.2 176.3 
HS748 4 611.6 183.3 
MGMT 4 105.8 - 
Total 90 - - 
Table 2: Calm Air Fleet 
Aircraft Type No. in Fleet In Service Since 
ATR42 7 2007 
ATR72 4 2010 
D328JET 2 2012 
HS748 1 1981 
Total 15 - 
Figure A: Calm Air System Map 
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Flight Attendants are assigned to duty as crewmembers on passenger-carrying flights. Cabin crew complement for the 
D328JET, the ATR42, and the ATR72 (when in combi configuration) is one; two Flight Attendants are assigned to ATR72 
flights when configured to full passenger configuration. 
Flight Operations are conducted under a Type ‘B’ co-authority operational control system. Flight Dispatch is conducted from 
the System Operations Coordination Centre in Winnipeg, and is staffed whenever flight operations are being conducted. 
Figure B: Calm Air Fleet Images 
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LOSA METHODOLOGY 
THE CALM AIR LOSA 
The decision to move forward with the LOSA was made collaboratively in March, 2014 in a meeting between members Calm 
Air flight operations management and pilot association leadership. Both groups agreed with the value of the project and a five-
person LOSA Steering Committee was formed which included two members of flight operations management (Director, 
Flight Operations and Chief Pilot), two line pilots nominated by ALPA (One Captain, one First Officer) and a project manager. 
LOSA Steering Committee 
The Steering Committee met to lay out the scope and timeline of the project, communicate LOSA to the organization (see 
Appendix B for communications sent to flight crews), identify solutions to expected challenges, and assemble a group of 
volunteer observers. Line pilots were invited in June to volunteer to participate as observers by forwarding their name to one 
of the ALPA representatives on the Steering Committee. Observers were selected by the Steering Committee; the 
committee first made a list of attributes that they felt were important in credible and capable observer group, and then the 
ALPA representative shared the list of names. In order to minimize bias and enhance credibility, management pilots would be 
excluded from conducting observations and use of check/training pilots would be minimized if possible. Unanimous 
agreement within the group was achieved and nine observers were selected. 
Observer Training and Calibration 
Many airlines contract out certain aspects of their LOSA while others conduct all aspects internally. Calm Air chose to conduct 
the LOSA internally with the exception of Observer training, which was conducted in July by Dr. Robert Baron of The Aviation 
Consulting Group. The four-day course covered all aspects of a LOSA with particular emphasis on Crew Resource 
Management (CRM), Threat and Error Management (TEM), data collection and calibration. A data collection instrument was 
finalized at this time (see Appendix A). 
Dataset 
Observations began the first week of August with the expectation of a two-month observation period and a goal of 80 unique 
observations as a sample of flying throughout the Calm Air network (aircraft type and route). While a larger sample size would 
have been desirable, this number was accepted as a compromise between what was required for a reasonable dataset and 
the resources that could be allocated to the project (observers were all active Calm Air line pilots). 
A subscription to an off-site, LOSA-specific database was purchased for data submission. Observers were issued hard-copy 
worksheets for note taking in the cockpit as well as Microsoft Surface tablets to enter the data electronically to the online 
database. 
Observation Flight Assignment 
The assignment of observation flights was semi-randomized. A list of desired routes was identified, along with a breakdown 
of sectors by aircraft type which was proportional to the number of hours flown annually by each type. Observers bid specific 
days in their schedule as a part of their normal bidding process (~4 days per month) and were then assigned sectors to 
observe on those days by the Project Manager that would reflect normal operations within the organization (i.e.; arctic 
operations, freighter operations, etc.) and were not limited to the type of aircraft that they normally flew. The observation 
schedule was not made known to the line crews; the Observer would report for duty at the same time as the operating crew 
and approach the Captain about conducting a LOSA observation. Flight crews were aware that LOSA was entirely voluntary 
and that there were no repercussions if they elected not to participate. If a Captain decided to refuse an observation for any 
reason, they would communicate it back in confidence to the Project Manager, who would then ensure that future planned 
observation sectors would not target the same Captain. Due to factors that included weather-related flight cancellations, 
illness, and recall to flying duties, the observation period was extended into early October in order to meet the sample size 
goal. 
Data Verification Roundtables 
Two data verification roundtables were conducted by the Steering Committee over 5 days in late October and November. 
Each observation was reviewed for accuracy and consistency. In some cases, similar events were found to be coded 
differently by different observers and were corrected to a consisted code. In other cases, events were logged as ‘errors’ 
where there was no existing guidance or standard in company documentation. These were recorded in a separate file outside 
of the LOSA as opportunities for improvement and were then removed from the LOSA dataset. 
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THE THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT MODEL (TEM) 
The framework of LOSA is based on the University of Texas Threat and Error Management model. This section discusses 
TEM, and its application within LOSA. The definitions used in this section have been taken directly from ICAO Doc 8309, Line 
Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) where a more detailed discussion can be found. 
TEM proposes that threats (such as adverse weather), errors (such as a pilot selecting a wrong automation mode), and 
undesired aircraft states (such as an altitude deviation) are everyday events that flight crews must manage to maintain safety. 
Therefore, flight crews that successfully manage these events regardless of occurrence are assumed to increase their 
potential for maintaining adequate safety margins. It is this notion that provides the overarching objective of TEM—to provide 
the best possible support for flight crews in managing threats, errors, and undesired aircraft states (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). 
Figure C: Threat and Error Management Model 
 
 
Threats 
Threats are external situations that must be managed by the cockpit crew during normal, everyday flights. Such events 
increase the operational complexity of the flight and pose a safety risk to the flight at some level. 
Threats may be expected or anticipated and, therefore, the crew may brief in advance. Threats may also be unexpected. As 
they occur suddenly and without any warning, there is no possibility for the crew to brief in advance. External threats may be 
relatively minor or major. 
Errors originated by non-cockpit personnel are considered external threats. For example, if the cockpit crew detects a fuel 
loading error made by ground staff, it would be entered as an external threat, not an error. The crew was not the source of 
the error (although they must manage it, as they would any other external threat). Other examples of non-cockpit crew errors 
that would be entered as external threats are errors in Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearances discovered by the crew, dispatch 
paperwork errors and discrepancies in passenger boarding counts by cabin attendants. 
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Table 4: LOSA Threat Categories 
Environmental Threats Examples 
Weather Icing conditions, Thunderstorms, Crosswinds, Windshear 
Airport Airport construction, Contaminated runways, out-of-service navaids 
ATC Challenging/Late clearances, Runway change, Non-standard phraseology 
Environmental  
Operational Pressure Traffic (air/ground congestion), TCAS alert, High terrain 
Airline Threats Examples 
Aircraft Malfunction Aircraft malfunction unexpected by crew, MEL items with operational 
implications, Automation events 
Airline Operational Pressure Operational time pressure (delays, OTP, late arriving crew or aircraft) 
Cabin/Cockpit Cabin event/distraction/interruption, Flight Attendant error, significant cockpit distraction/interruption 
Dispatch/Paperwork Dispatch/Paperwork error or event 
Ground/Ramp Ground/Ramp error or event 
Ground Maintenance Ground Maintenance error or event 
Manuals/Charts Errors associated with Approach Charts or Manuals 
 
Errors 
Cockpit crew error is defined as an action or inaction by the crew that leads to deviations from organizational or flight crew 
intentions or expectations. Errors in the operational context tend to reduce the margin of safety and increase the probability of 
accidents or incidents. Errors may be defined in terms of non-compliance with regulations, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) and policies, or unexpected deviation from crew, company or ATC expectations. Errors observed may be minor 
(selecting the wrong altitude into the mode control panel (MCP), but correcting it quickly) or major (forgetting to do an 
essential checklist).  
 
Table 5: LOSA Error Categories 
Aircraft Handling Errors Examples 
Automation Failure to use flight directors, Wrong altitude entered 
Flight Control Decision to use wrong thrust/power, Wrong flaps setting 
Ground Navigation Attempting/turning down wrong taxiway, Failure to hold short 
Manual Handling Unintentional vertical deviation, Speed deviation by choice 
Systems/Instrument/Radio Wrong altimeter settings, Wrong TCAS setting, Using equipment placarded as 
INOP 
Procedural Errors Examples 
Briefing Omitted approach briefing, Brief performed late 
Callout Incorrect approach callouts, Nonstandard landing callouts 
Checklist Checklist not performed to completion, Self-initiated checklist (not called for by CA) 
PF/PNF PF makes own automation mode changes, PNF carries out PF duties 
SOP Cross Verification Failure to cross-verify altimeter settings, Failure to clarify MEL or logbook entry 
Other Procedural Duties performed at inappropriate time, Pushback without clearing left or right 
Communication Errors Examples 
Pilot to Pilot 
Crew miscommunication of information, Misinterpretation of ATIS, Sterile cockpit 
violation 
Crew to External Use of nonstandard ATC phraseology, failure to give readback to ATC 
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LOSA considers three possible responses by crews to errors: 
1. Trap: An active flight crew response in which an error is detected and managed to an inconsequential outcome; 
2. Exacerbate: A flight crew response in which an error is detected but the crew action or inaction allows it to induce 
an additional error, Undesired Aircraft State, incident or accident; and 
3. Fail to respond: The lack of a flight crew response to an error because it was either ignored or undetected. 
 
The outcome of the error is dependent upon the flight crew response. LOSA considers three possible outcomes of errors 
depending upon crew response: 
1. Inconsequential: An outcome that indicates the alleviation of risk that was previously caused by an error; 
2. Undesired Aircraft State: An outcome in which the aircraft is unnecessarily placed in a compromising situation that 
poses an increased risk to safety; and 
3. Additional Error: An outcome that was the result of or is closely linked to a previous error. 
 
Undesired Aircraft States (UAS) 
An “Undesired Aircraft State” occurs when the flight crew places the aircraft in a situation of unnecessary risk. For instance, 
an altitude deviation is an Undesired Aircraft State that presents unnecessary risk. An Undesired Aircraft State may occur in 
response to a crew action or inaction (error). It is important to distinguish between errors and the Undesired Aircraft State that 
can result. If an Undesired Aircraft State is observed, there should always be a crew error that is responsible for this 
undesired state. Such errors may be miscommunications, lack of proficiency, poor decision making or wilful violation of 
regulations. 
 
Table 6: LOSA UAS Categories 
Undesired Aircraft States Examples 
Aircraft Handling Low speed deviation, Unnecessary weather penetration, Unstable approach 
Ground Navigation Runway incursion, Wrong taxiway 
Incorrect A/C Configuration Incorrect systems/instrument/radio configuration, incorrect engine configuration 
 
LOSA considers three possible crew responses to Undesired Aircraft States: 
1. Mitigate: An active flight crew response to an Undesired Aircraft State that results in the alleviation of risk by 
returning from the Undesired Aircraft State to safe flight; 
2. Exacerbate: A flight crew response in which an Undesired Aircraft State is detected, but the flight crew action or 
inaction allows it to induce an additional error, incident or accident; and 
3. Fail to respond: The lack of an active flight crew response to an Undesired Aircraft State because it was ignored or 
undetected. 
 
LOSA considers three possible outcomes to Undesired Aircraft States: 
1. Recovery: An outcome that indicates the alleviation of risk that was previously caused by an Undesired Aircraft 
State; 
2. End State/Incident/Accident: Any undesired ending that completes the activity sequence with a negative, terminal 
outcome. These outcomes may be of little consequence, for example, a long landing or a landing too far to the left or 
right of the centreline, or may result in a reportable incident or in an accident; and 
3. Additional error: The flight crew action or inaction that results in or is closely linked to another cockpit crew error. 
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LOSA SAMPLE 
The LOSA sampled 83 flight sectors during the 10-week 
observation period, representing approximately 2% of the total 
sectors flown by the company in that period.  
Eight Observers collected data, completing on average 10.3 
observations each with no member of the group completing fewer 
than 8. Sampling succeeded in capturing a number of sectors for 
each aircraft type which was proportional to the total number of 
flight hours flown by that type annually. Due to the number of flight 
crew operating the HS748 and the limited future of the aircraft in 
the fleet, the decision was made to not observe flights on this 
aircraft type for the LOSA. 
Sectors were sampled throughout the Calm Air network and 
included passenger flying, all-cargo freighter flights, as well as 
several charter flights flying in and out of 16 airports. Flight duration 
ranged from 0:10 to 3:29 with an average of 1:13 (SD=40 mins). A 
late departure was noted if the aircraft taxied from the gate more 
than 10 minutes past the scheduled departure time.  
Efforts were made by the Steering Committee to see that sectors 
which were known to be specifically sensitive to flight crews (i.e.; 
freighter flights to destinations in northwest Ontario and high-arctic 
Nunavut) were sampled, however after several failed attempts due 
to weather and operational changes this became logistically 
impractical to complete by the end of the observation period. A map 
of the observed sectors, along with the frequency of the aircraft 
types observed can be found on the following page. 
Flight crews were surveyed for basic demographic data at the end 
of the observation. On average, Captains had twice as much 
experience as First Officers, both in total flying time and total flight 
time on the aircraft type. 
Descent and approach information was also captured for each 
sector. In slightly more than half of the observations, the crew 
conducted the approach briefing before the top of descent (TOD). 
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) on approach were dominant 
within the sample. Accordingly, a visual approach was the most 
frequently observed type of approach. 
While autopilot disconnect altitudes were not generally recorded by 
observers, 87% of approaches were flown with the autopilot 
engaged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Sample Descriptives 
Aircraft Type Frequency 
ATR42 51 (55.4%) 
D328 17 (20.5%) 
ATR72 15 (18.1%) 
HS748 0 (0.0%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Late Departure Frequency 
Yes 46 (55.4%) 
No 37 (44.6%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Pilot Flying Frequency 
Captain 46 (55.4%) 
First Officer 37 (44.6%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Crew Familiarity Frequency 
CAPT/FO Had Flown Together Before 73 (88.0%) 
CAPT/FO Had Not Flown Together 
Before 
10 (12.0%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
CAPT Experience Average (Hrs) 
Total Flight Time 10,798 
Flight Time on Type 2,108 
FO Experience Average (Hrs) 
Total Flight Time 5,475 
Flight Time on Type 1,106 
Briefing Complete Before TOD Frequency 
Yes 48 (57.8%) 
No 35 (42.2%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Descent Began At or Before TOD Frequency 
Yes 77 (92.8%) 
No 6 (7.2%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Descent Got Significantly Above or 
Below Normal Profile 
Frequency 
Yes 9 (10.8%) 
No 74 (89.2%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Weather on Approach Frequency 
VMC 69 (83.1%) 
IMC 14 (16.9%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Type of Approach Flown Frequency 
Visual 61 (73.5%) 
Non-Precision 16 (19.3%) 
Precision 6 (7.2%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Visual Approach Backed-up by  
Instrument System Frequency 
Yes 36 (59.0%) 
No 15 (41.0%) 
Total 61 (100.0%) 
Hand-Flown/Autopilot Frequency 
Autopilot 72 (86.7%) 
Hand-Flown 11 (13.3%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
Approach Got Significantly Above or 
Below Normal Profile 
Frequency 
Yes 3 (3.6%) 
No 80 (96.4%) 
Total 83 (100.0%) 
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Table 8: LOSA 2014 Observation List 
Obs 
No 
ID 
No 
AC 
Type Departure Arrival 
Flight 
Time   
Obs 
No 
ID 
No 
AC 
Type Departure Arrival 
Flight 
Time  
1 7 D328 YWG YYQ 1.8  43 52 ATR42 YTH YGO 0.7 
2 8 D328 YRT YWG 2.6  44 53 ATR42 YGO YTH 0.7 
3 9 ATR42 YYQ YWG 2.4  45 54 D328 YWG YYQ 1.8 
4 10 ATR72 YWG YQD 1.6  46 55 D328 YYQ YRT 0.9 
5 11 ATR72 YFO YWG 1.4  47 56 D328 YWG YTH 1.1 
6 12 ATR42 YTH YGO 0.7  48 57 D328 YTH YFO 0.6 
7 13 ATR42 YGO YIV 0.3  49 58 ATR42 YWG YQR 1.3 
8 14 ATR42 YRT YEK 0.6  50 59 ATR42 YQR YWG 1.4 
9 15 ATR42 YRT YEK 0.7  51 66 ATR42 YRT YUT 1.0 
10 16 ATR42 YEK YYQ 0.6  52 93 ATR42 YUT YZS 0.7 
11 17 ATR42 YEK YRT 0.7  53 102 ATR42 YEK YRT 0.7 
12 18 D328 YYQ YWG 1.6  54 103 ATR72 YWG YGX 1.9 
13 21 ATR72 YWG YGX 2.0  55 104 ATR72 YGX YTH 0.6 
14 22 ATR42 YTH YGX 0.7  56 105 ATR42 YWG YTH 0.7 
15 23 ATR42 YYQ YWG 2.7  57 106 ATR42 YWG YGX 1.9 
16 24 ATR42 YWG YSK 3.5  58 108 ATR42 YGX YWG 1.8 
17 25 ATR42 YWG YQD 1.2  59 109 D328 YWG YQD 1.0 
18 26 ATR42 YFO YWG 1.6  60 110 D328 YQD YFO 0.2 
19 27 ATR72 YWG YTH 1.7  61 111 ATR42 YWG YQD 1.5 
20 28 ATR72 YTH YGX 0.7  62 112 ATR42 YQD YFO 0.4 
21 29 D328 YTH YFO 0.7  63 113 ATR42 ZTM YTH 1.0 
22 30 ATR72 YTH ZTM 0.8  64 114 ATR72 YYQ YEK 0.7 
23 31 ATR42 YEK YYQ 0.7  65 115 ATR72 YEK YYQ 0.7 
24 32 D328 YFO YWG 1.2  66 116 ATR42 YWG YQD 1.2 
25 33 D328 YTH YWG 1.3  67 117 ATR42 YFO YWG 1.3 
26 34 ATR42 YEK YXN 0.4  68 118 ATR42 YWG YTH 1.7 
27 35 ATR42 YXN YRT 0.3  69 119 ATR72 YYQ YRT 1.7 
28 36 ATR72 YTH YGX 0.6  70 120 D328 YWG YTH 1.2 
29 37 ATR72 YGX YWG 1.8  71 121 ATR42 YWG YFO 1.8 
30 38 ATR42 YFO YQD 0.4  72 122 ATR42 YFO YTH 0.8 
31 39 ATR42 YQD YWG 1.2  73 123 ATR42 YWG YQD 1.5 
32 40 ATR42 YSK YWG 2.2  74 124 ATR42 YQD YTH 0.8 
33 41 ATR42 YTH ZTM 1.0  75 125 D328 YTH YQD 0.8 
34 42 D328 YWG YQD 1.1  76 126 ATR42 YTH YQD 1.9 
35 43 ATR42 YWG YYQ 2.4  77 127 D328 YWG YTH 1.3 
36 44 ATR42 YWG YTH 1.9  78 129 D328 YTH YFO 0.6 
37 45 ATR42 YTH YWG 1.6  79 130 ATR42 YWG YYQ 2.8 
38 46 ATR42 YWG YQD 1.3  80 131 ATR42 YYQ YWG 2.0 
39 47 ATR42 YQD YFO 0.2  81 132 ATR42 YWG YQD 1.6 
40 48 ATR72 YWG YGX 1.7  82 133 ATR42 YQD YFO 0.4 
41 49 ATR72 YGX YTH 0.5  83 134 ATR42 YYQ YEK 0.7 
42 51 ATR42 YTH YWG 1.7        
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Figure D: LOSA 2014 Observation Map 
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THREATS 
LOSA threat prevalence and findings are detailed below by phase of flight and tabulated by threat category. 
Table 9: Threat 
Threat Prevalence  Frequency 
Environmental Threats  42% (78) 
Weather 42% (32)   
Airport 4% (8)   
ATC 16% (29)   
Environmental Operational Pressure 5% (9)   
Airline Threats  58% (106) 
Aircraft Malfunction 23% (42)   
Airline Operational Pressure 8% (15)   
Cabin/Cockpit 11% (21)   
Dispatch/Paperwork 4% (8)   
Ground/Ramp 8% (15)   
Ground Maintenance 1% (1)   
Manuals/Charts 2% (2)   
Total  100% (184) 
Threat Discussed by Crew Prior to Encountering   
Yes  34% (62)  
No  66% (122)  
Total  100% (184) 
Threat Outcome   
Inconsequential  84% (155)  
Lined to Flight Crew Error  16% (29)  
Total  100% (184) 
 
LOSA observers recorded a total of 184 threats over the course of 83 observations, an average of 2.2 threats per flight. The 
vast majority of threats were encountered by crews during only two phases of flight: Pre-departure/Taxi (42%), where crews 
were more likely to encounter Airline threats, and Descent/Approach/Landing (33%) where they were more likely to 
encounter Environmental threats. 
Figure E: Threat Prevalence by Phase of Flight 
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Figure F: Top Threats Bar Graph 
 
Figure G: Threat Outcomes 
 
 
LATENT THREATS 
During the Data Verification Roundtables, the Steering Committee encountered a number of findings entered by observers 
which did not clearly fit into the TEM/LOSA framework and were not consistently reported by observers, though they did 
have validity as complexity which the crew had to manage. While these entries were removed from the dataset, the Steering 
Committee elected to have them discussed in the final report as latent threats. A latent threat is an event or condition which 
is generally hidden within the system and may not be obvious to the flight crew, such as organizational culture, equipment 
design issues, or optical illusions.  
In particular, there are 3 latent threats which were prevalent during the LOSA observation period which merit 
acknowledgement: 
 Area of Operations: The majority of the organization’s area of operations lay outside of ATC radar coverage and 
controlled airspace; only two of the airports which were observed were served by an ATC tower. The vast majority 
of flights were flown into or out of airports in Class E control zones or Class G uncontrolled airspace where crews 
were required to ensure separation from VFR and in some cases other IFR aircraft. While all of the airports captured 
in the LOSA sample were served by approach path lighting or electronic glideslope, the small communities in very 
remote areas can offer limited horizons during hours of darkness and present optimal conditions for “black hole” 
effect and somatogravic illusions for flight crews. 
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 Pilot Scheduling/Workload: The observation period ran from August until mid-October. Traditionally, the company 
does additional flying in the summer season (fishing lodges, forest fire evacuations); it is also an understandably 
desired employee vacation period, which the use of line pilots as LOSA observers would have exacerbated. A review 
of monthly flight times for the observation period as compared to the same period in 2013 revealed that ATR flight 
crews flew about the same number hours (~58 hrs/mo) while Dornier crews flew slightly more (~49 hrs/mo).The 
resultant effect was that certain elements of the pilot group shouldered a greater portion of the workload than other 
months where flying hours were more evenly distributed. While the assessment of pilot fatigue by a jumpseat 
observer would be highly subjective, onset of fatigue can be insidious and can affect every aspect of human 
performance. 
 RNAV Approach Authority (ATR42/72): At the time of the LOSA, flight crew operating ATR42/72 were authorized 
for RNAV terminal and enroute operations, but restricted from conducting IFR RNAV instrument approach 
procedures despite being equipped with approach-capable flight management systems. The reasons for the 
restriction is related to flight simulator equipage and is beyond the scope of this report, however flight crews were 
faced with having FMS equipment in their aircraft which could be used to enhance situational awareness but lacked 
the authority (and therefore the procedures and training) to make use of the system to the fullest extent. This had 
the added effect of varying individual levels of systems knowledge, personal work-around procedures and strategies 
being used throughout the pilot group. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS 
Environmental Sub-Threat: Weather  
Flight crews managed the most prevalent weather threat – 
thunderstorms – very effectively, displaying high levels of 
situational awareness and being willing to delay flight 
progress to mitigate risk. 
 Using the weather radar in position on the runway 
to scan the departure path, and then asking ATC 
for an immediate turn after takeoff in order to 
avoid the worst of the weather 
 Active use of weather radar enroute to deviate around convective weather and discussing contingency plans 
 Captain delayed the departure by 30 minutes to allow thunderstorms to pass over the airport. 
In several cases, crews were either unable to access current weather information for their destination, or the information that 
they obtained had changed by the time of arrival. 
 Crew expected VFR weather at destination without weather reporting; weather turned out to be overcast at 
between 900-1000 feet. 
 Destination airport wind information was not available, so the crew picked up weather from the nearest airport which 
was reporting (90NM away); the crew conducted a straight-in approach with a tailwind which resulted in an unstable 
approach. 
 Crew obtained weather from a CARs operator prior to descent. Clouds were reported to be scattered at 1000 feet; 
actual conditions were found to be overcast at 1200 feet on the approach. 
Environmental Sub-Threat: Airport 
The airport threats encountered were largely related to 
conditions at the time of the flight as well as the airport 
facilities themselves. 
 Birds on the runway and in the area of the 
approach path 
 ‘Misleading’ PAPI indications on approach 
 Two windsocks installed next to each other, making it difficult for the crew to interpret on short final (airport 
upgrades were in progress) 
 In one case, the crew spotted an individual walking parallel to the runway approximately 20 feet from the edge while 
taxiing for departure. 
Table 10: Environmental Sub-threat - Weather 
Weather  Frequency 
Thunderstorms/turbulence 13 
Icing only 7 
Other adverse weather threat 5 
Crosswind, tailwind, gusty or high winds aloft 4 
IMC only 3 
Turbulence only 1 
Total 33 
Table 11: Environmental Sub-threat - Airport 
Airport  Frequency 
Other airport threat 4 
Other runway threats 2 
Contaminated taxiway/runway 1 
Total 7 
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Environmental Sub-Threat: ATC 
Air Traffic Control is often cited in LOSAs for providing a 
meaningful proportion of threats; this also held true in this 
safety audit. ATC instructions often present the crew with 
some form of ‘change’ which must be understood, briefed 
and managed between the flight crew, particularly when 
the change was not anticipated. Many ATC threats would 
be considered as benign, everyday aspects of flight in 
controlled airspace, however crews encountered many 
which required active intervention and management. 
 ATC cleared a flight to wrong-way altitude for direction of flight. The crew did not question the clearance; the 
controller eventually queried the crew as to why they had stopped their climb (at their assigned level-off altitude) and 
were then cleared to their flight planned altitude. 
 Runway changes due to shifting winds or offered to the crew by ATC for efficiency 
 When taxiing for departure at an uncontrolled airport, crews interrupted checklists or briefings in order to accept an 
IFR clearance from FSS radio (4 cases) 
 Flight was vectored in tight for a visual approach. The beacon crossing restriction was cancelled and ATC asked the 
crew to ‘keep it in tight’ 
 Crew inbound to land was cleared to a waypoint which was not easily or readily located on a chart. Crew had correct 
spelling, though took several minutes to locate the waypoint – was only published on the ‘ARKAY ONE’ departure 
chart in the CAP. 
 ATC Tower called an aircraft on short final seeking information about where the crew planned to exit the runway 
Environmental Sub-Threat: Environmental Operational Pressure 
All events logged in this category by observers related to 
conflicting traffic and aircraft sequencing in and out of 
uncontrolled environments.  
 VFR aircraft operating in the vicinity (with and 
without transponder, not always represented on TCAS) 
 Inaccurate/inconsistent estimates from other aircraft, and multiple aircraft inbound to land at destination with same 
estimated time of arrival 
 ATC gave a crew a departure clearance with a restriction to be airborne by a specific time due to inbound traffic, 
however the traffic was several minutes earlier than expected. Crew taxied clear of runway and cancelled their 
clearance to avoid rushing the departure. 
 A particular challenge occurs when crews attempt to estimate the time available to taxi, complete checklists and 
briefings and for the Flight Attendant(s) to secure the cabin for departure when other aircraft are inbound to land. 
  
Table 12: Environmental Sub-threat - ATC 
ATC  Frequency 
Other ATC threat 14 
ATC command – challenging clrnces, late changes 6 
ATC error 3 
ATC runway change 3 
ATC language difficulty 1 
ATC radio congestion 1 
Total 29 
Table 13: Environmental Sub-threat - Environmental Operational      
 Pressure 
Environmental Operational Pressure Frequency 
Traffic (air or ground congestion) 9 
Total 9 
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AIRLINE THREATS 
Airline Sub-Threat: Aircraft Malfunction 
Crews occasionally operated aircraft with equipment 
deferred in accordance with the Minimum Equipment List 
(MEL); observers noted high levels of awareness and 
management of the associated operational implications 
and substitute procedures (APU generator [D328], brake 
temperature monitoring system [ATR], propeller 
synchrohpaser [ATR]). 
Various relatively minor malfunctions and anomalies were encountered, including issues with an audio control panel, a 
missing control knob from a transponder which prevented a crew from squawking their assigned code, a yaw damper that 
would not engage, an altimeter which was intermittently presenting an ‘OFF’ flag, and flight idle gate that would not open on 
touchdown. There were also two anomalies which presented themselves with regularity in the dataset: 
 Master Caution / EFIS COMP – Heading (ATR): This alerts the crew that there is a discrepancy between the 
Captain and FO heading information in excess of 5°. This alert was highly prevalent; on one observation it occurred 
twice during a 14 minute flight and on another it occurred three times within 15 minutes on a 40 minute flight, and 
all occurrences in the dataset were seen on flights operating in Northern Domestic Airspace. The flight crew did not 
always acknowledge the alert, only reaching up to cancel it the Master Caution. The QRH checklist was not 
consulted in any case, though the checklist items were completed from memory by the crew. 
 Master Caution / BLEED SOV FAIL (D328): This alert is very similar to the one described above; the fault was a 
common occurrence and crews reset the valve switch, completing the QRH checklist by memory without physically 
referencing it. 
A number of issues in the cabin were brought to the flight crews’ attention by flight attendants. These issues included a 
problem with a galley service panel and several issues with lavatory doors; one door continuously coming off of its tracks, and 
another door jammed closed while someone was in the lavatory. 
Finally, there were two abnormalities which were serious enough that they required air turnbacks. One event involved a 
Master Warning / Elec Smoke immediately after takeoff (ATR), and the other involved uncontrollable cockpit/cabin 
temperature (hot) due to a malfunction in the air conditioning system. 
Airline Sub-Threat: Airline Operational Pressure 
While this sub-threat category is open to some degree of 
subjectivity, observers noted events which had the 
potential to create internally-driven (individual) or externally-
driven (organization) expectations to rush, continue 
operation, or to deviate from accepted procedure. 
 Crew planning & coordination close to departure time: Issues were noted with late delivery or amendments to 
passenger manifests, the absence of a passenger manifest (charter flight), and delays in confirming fuel loads in 
order to minimize possible bumping of baggage or cargo. 
 Late departures: Late departures were noted in 55% of the LOSA sample, though observers only noted this as a 
threat to the crew in 6 cases (cargo/loading delay, lightening/thunderstorms in area, late arrival of aircraft, crew 
scheduling miscommunication), though none were found to be consequential. 
 Aircraft serviceability issues passed from crew to crew and implied expectation to continue operation: There 
were two instances where observation crews accepted verbal information from the previous flight crew about 
intermittent serviceability issues, though maintenance had not been contacted, nor a defect entered in the aircraft 
journey logbook.  
In one of those cases, the previous Captain mentioned having difficulty with the cockpit/cabin temperature 
controller, but that he was able to get it working. The LOSA observer’s entry explained, “The Capt taking over called 
maintenance and asked them to check the system, no snag was recorded in the journey log, nothing was MEL'd.  
Maintenance's response was that they couldn't find anything wrong, it sounded like an air cycle machine might be 
acting up, but it was an 8 hour job and $30,000 part.” The flight departed and resulted in an air turnback when the 
temperature could not be controlled. 
Table 14: Airline Sub-threat –  Aircraft Malfunction 
Aircraft Malfunction  Frequency 
Aircraft malfunction unexpected by crew 26 
MEL/CDL with operational implications 8 
Other aircraft malfunction threat 5 
Automation event or anomaly 3 
Total 42 
Table 15: Airline Sub-threat –  Airline Operational Pressure 
Airline Operational Pressure Frequency 
Operational time pressure (delays, OTP, late arriving 
pilot or aircraft) 11 
Other airline operational pressure threat 4 
Total 15 
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Airline Sub-Threat: Cabin/Cockpit 
Over half of these threats logged by observers involved 
the interruption of a checklist or briefing by a call from the 
Flight Attendant (main door closure, commissary order, 
and ‘cabin secure’). In some cases, crews acknowledged 
the interruption and re-ran checklists, though in many 
others the crew carried on. Observers noted that crews 
were very willing to interrupt their task and immediately 
communicate with the Flight Attendant rather than finishing their briefing/checklist and then responding. Despite this, only 
one instance was linked to a flight crew error. 
The sterile cockpit policy between cockpit and cabin crew was not complied with in two cases, though it appeared that the 
Flight Attendant may have been unaware of the aircraft’s position. 
In one case, a flight attendant was seriously injured after attempting to un-jam a lavatory door (finger); the flight crew asked 
her to come the flight deck so that they could assess the extent of the injury. 
Another relevant aspect of this sub-threat group is that 86% occurred at or below 10,000ft, and 50% of threats happened 
while the aircraft was on the ground. 
Airline Sub-Threat: Dispatch/Paperwork 
Threats logged in this category were primarily related to 
the operational flight plan (OFP). Errors on the OFP were 
noted by crews with respect to routing & cruising altitude, 
the omission of MEL items on the aircraft and inaccurate 
aircraft weight and balance configuration - these were 
resolved through collaborative discussion with Flight 
Dispatch. There was a case however where the crew did not notice that their expected routing (direct to destination) was 
actually filed via airways until they received their clearance from ATC, despite having a copy of their flight plan. 
Airline Sub-Threat: Ground/Ramp 
Crews encountered threats on the ground related to 
aircraft movements and aircraft loading and unloading. 
Roughly half of the threats that were logged were 
associated with aircraft arriving at a destination and ground 
support was not ready and available. In several instances, 
marshallers were not available to direct aircraft on the ramp, and ground power units (GPU) were not available prior to 
shutdown. 
Aircraft loading errors were encountered, presenting a threat for flight crews to manage. There was an event where 
dangerous good were found to be loaded on the aircraft without the crew being aware (the crew coordinated with Cargo and 
obtained a NOTOC), and another where cargo had been improperly loaded (paint loaded on its side and leaked) in the cargo 
compartment between the cockpit and the cabin (crew contacted Maintenance for guidance and cleaned up the mess). Other 
errors comprised of events where load control forms detailing the cargo weight on the aircraft were not available to the crew. 
Observers separately logged two threats related to weight and balance issues onboard ATR72 ‘combi’ aircraft where the 
crew intervened. In one case, passengers were deplaning and cargo crews were unloading the aircraft simultaneously and 
the crew became concerned about the aircraft becoming ‘tail-heavy’ (crew asked cargo to unload the tail baggage 
compartment first). In the other case, the crew arrived to find the aircraft loaded significantly ‘nose-heavy’ with cargo, and due 
to the low passenger load on that sector, passenger weight would not bring the center of gravity (CofG) into limits (the crew 
had cargo re-distribute the cargo on the aircraft). 
Airline Sub-Threat: Ground Maintenance 
The only threat logged in this category was related to the 
crew identifying a discrepancy with the “next maintenance 
required by XXXX” card inside the journey logbook (the 
crew contacted maintenance and resolved the issue). 
Table 16: Airline Sub-threat –  Cabin/Cockpit 
Cabin/Cockpit Frequency 
Cabin event/distraction/interruption 12 
Flight attendant error 4 
Significant cockpit distraction/interruption 3 
Other cabin/cockpit threat 2 
Total 21 
Table 17: Airline Sub-threat –  Dispatch/Paperwork 
Dispatch/Paperwork Frequency 
Dispatch/Paperwork Error 6 
Other dispatch/paperwork threat 1 
Dispatch/paperwork event 1 
Total 8 
Table 18: Airline Sub-threat –  Ground/Ramp 
Ground/Ramp Frequency 
Other Ground/Ramp threat 9 
Ground crew error 6 
Total 15 
Table 19: Airline Sub-threat –  Ground Maintenance 
Ground Maintenance Frequency 
Maintenance error 1 
Total 1 
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Airline Sub-Threat: Manuals/Charts 
Three of the four threats were logged in relation to 
approach plates found to be missing from the flight deck 
(aircraft libraries contain two copies of the relevant Canada 
Air Pilot volumes; one of those volumes was missing). 
 
Summary 
The crews that were observed discussed only 1/3 of the threats they encountered prior to encountering them. This may 
reflect weak threat awareness or identification, or perhaps that crews encounter certain threats so frequently that they have 
become accustomed to their existence. The most frequently discussed threats prior to their encounter were Weather (14%) 
and Aircraft Malfunction (8%). Conversely, the most frequently encountered threats which were not discussed prior to their 
encounter were Aircraft Malfunction (15%), ATC (13%) and Cabin/Cockpit (11%). 
The vast majority of threats encountered (84%) resulted in inconsequential outcomes; in 29 cases though, crew 
mismanagement of the threat was linked to at least one error being committed. Aircraft Malfunction (11 cases) was the most 
frequent error-linked threat, followed by Weather (6 cases) and ATC (4 cases). Coincidentally, these same categories 
represent the most frequently encountered threats which were inconsequential as well. 
A review of the altitude at which threats were encountered reveals the prevalence of threats at lower altitudes. The vast 
majority of threats were encountered below 10,000ft (78%), with nearly half (47%) occurring on the ground, suggesting that 
crews encounter most threats near the beginning and near the end of their flights. 
 
Figure H: Threat Prevalence by Altitude 
 
 
 
Table 20: Airline Sub-threat –  Manuals/Charts 
Manuals/Charts Frequency 
Other Manuals/Charts threat 4 
Total 4 
Pre-Departure/Taxi Takeoff/Climb Cruise Descent/Approach/Land Taxi/Park 
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ERRORS 
LOSA error prevalence and findings are detailed below by phase of flight and tabulated by error category. 
Table 21: Error 
Error Prevalence  Frequency 
Aircraft Handling Errors  25% (62) 
Automation 4% (10)   
Flight Control 4% (10)   
Ground Navigation <1% (1)   
Manual Handling 7% (18)   
Systems/Instrument/Radio 9% (23)   
Procedural Errors  58% (144) 
Briefing 2% (6)   
Callout 11% (28)   
Checklist 14% (34)   
Documentation 1% (3)  
PF/PNF 6% (15)   
SOP Cross Verification 9% (22)   
Other Procedural 15% (36)   
Communication Errors  17% (42) 
Pilot to Pilot 11% (28)   
Crew to External 6% (14)   
Total  100% (248) 
 
LOSA observers recorded a total of 248 errors over the course of 83 observations, an average of 3.0 errors per flight. The 
majority of errors occurred during Pre-departure/Taxi (25%), Takeoff/Climb (19%) and Descent/Approach/Landing (33%) 
phases of flight. In all phases, Procedural errors were the most frequently observed. 
 
Figure I: Error Prevalence by Phase of Flight 
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Figure J: Top Errors Bar Graph 
 
 
AIRCRAFT HANDLING ERRORS 
Aircraft Handling Sub-Error: Automation 
The errors noted in this category reflect errors in executing 
automation tasks, as well as decisions on how automated 
systems were used. 
Events related to autopilot and flight director use were 
noted: 
 On departure, the heading bug was not aligned 
with the runway; when the autopilot was 
engaged at 1000 ft AGL, the aircraft immediately banked in the wrong direction 
 Crew received a new clearance and entered it in the FMS, though ‘NAV’ mode was not selected. The aircraft flew 
through the desired track in ‘HDG’ mode; crew noticed the error when the aircraft was 2.4 NM left of the track in 
controlled airspace. 
The decision to select a particular altitude in the altitude pre-selector was identified on multiple flights. In situations where the 
crew was flying above an overcast layer but anticipated VMC weather for the approach at destination, the crew set what they 
referred to as a “VFR altitude” in the pre-selector which was below the minimum IFR altitude (25NM safe altitude). There 
were cases where the aircraft broke out of cloud above the minimum IFR altitude and had visual contact with the ground; 
there were others however where risk was increased, as described by one observer: 
“The Captain told the FO he was planning the visual approach into [destination] because the last weather 
out of [nearby airport] (approximately 50nm SSE of [destination]) was VFR at 3000 feet overcast and greater 
than 6 miles visibility. 
The Captain asked for an altitude of 1400 feet to be set in the ADU and began a descent on profile 
approximately 35nm from Gods Lake Narrows; the FO didn't challenge him on it. 1400 feet is the minimum 
altitude for the NDB approach into [destination] (100NM safe alt is 2500ft; 25NM safe alt is 2200ft). 
The weather in [destination] turned out not to be VFR. It was overcast at approximately 900-1000 feet with 
good visibility. The crew descended below the 25nm safe altitude and below published procedure turn 
altitudes and levelled off at 1400 feet ASL (700 feet AGL) approximately 7nm from the airport on the 
inbound approach track.” 
It is worth noting that in the above described event, the aircraft inbound track and approach course were nearly aligned; the 
NDB is at the airport and there is no FAF for this approach. The aircraft levelled out at the MDA within the safe area, though 
this profile (700t AGL at 7NM from airport) generated a GPWS terrain warning due to configuration (noted in UAS section of 
this report, p.35). 
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Table 22: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error - Automation 
Automation  Frequency 
Wrong MCP/FCU altitude setting dialed 2 
Discretionary omission of FMC/FMGC data 1 
Failure to execute a FMC/FMGC mode when needed 1 
Inappropriate disconnection of automatics 1 
Wrong MCP/FCU heading set or dialed 1 
Wrong MCP/FCU mode left engaged 1 
Total 7 
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Aircraft Handling Sub-Error: Flight Control 
Events in this category were largely related to errors or 
omission or awareness. 
 Crew did not conduct a ‘max thrust’ takeoff when 
taking off into icing conditions 
 Crew forgot to reduce thrust from ‘max takeoff’ 
to ‘max climb’ after takeoff (detected and 
corrected at 7000ft) 
 Crew advanced condition levers to ‘max’ prior to landing to ‘provide better reverse thrust capability’ (ATR72) 
 PF requested flap extension above max flap extension speed (PNF advised and delayed extension until within limit) 
 Several airspeed overspeed deviations during descent due to excess power 
 Engine #2 over-torque to 96% during climb 
Aircraft Handling Sub-Error: Ground Navigation 
The only event logged in this category related to a crew 
which began maneuvering for an incorrect taxi route which 
was quickly identified by the FO and corrected by the 
Captain. 
 
Manual Handling 
The manual handling errors observed can be grouped into 
a handful of themes: 
 Above descent profile/High on approach: 
Multiple instances were noted where the aircraft 
became high on the normal descent profile or 
high on the final approach path; some of the 
approach deviations were the result of the above-
normal decent profile. 
 Speed deviations: Multiple high speed events 
were noted, though unlike the profile deviations 
above, speed events were much more likely to result in an undesired aircraft state. Airspace speed violations were 
also noted several arrivals into Winnipeg, where there is a requirement to slow to 200kts or less when within 10NM 
and 3000ft AGL of the airport. In one case, the aircraft was at 230kts at 2300ft AGL 7NM from the airport and only 
began to slow in order to configure, and in another the aircraft was at 245kts at 2300ft AGL when ATC advised the 
crew, “you have 100kts on the 737 in front of you” and instructed them to slow. 
The combination of these factors (multiple errors) resulting in an unstable approach was observed as an aircraft transitioned to 
a visual approach into Flin Flon. The crew was using an RNAV approach waypoint (FAF) to conduct a visual approach. The 
FMS/autopilot anticipated the turn to final approach inside the FAF and the approach was flown at high speed, attaining the 
approach path by short final. A 10kt tailwind was noted by the crew on short final, and combined with the flare which was 
initiated at REF+10, the aircraft floated and used up most of the runway in order to stop. 
Finally, an event occurred where the crew intended to deviate around convective weather on descent, but ended in an 
inadvertent weather penetration. The crew had been briefing the approach when they were interrupted by a ‘cabin secure’ 
call from the Flight Attendant. During the interruption, the PF selected a heading to deviate around the weather ahead. When 
the crew resumed their briefing, they diverted their attention away from the weather; the initial heading was not sufficient 
and resulted in the aircraft flying through the convective cloud anyways. 
 
 
 
Table 23: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error – Flight Control 
Flight Control  Frequency 
Wrong thrust/power settings 5 
Other flight control error 2 
Decision to use wrong thrust/power 1 
Intentional Noncompliance – Other flight control error 1 
Total 9 
Table 24: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error – Ground Navigation 
Ground Navigation  Frequency 
Attempting or turning down a wrong 
gate/taxiway/ramp/hold spot 1 
Total 1 
Table 25: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error – Manual Handling 
Manual Handling  Frequency 
Unintentional speed deviation 5 
Unintentional vertical deviation 4 
Speed deviation by choice 2 
Intentional Noncompliance – Intentionally flying a 
nonstandard visual approach 1 
Intentional Noncompliance – Intentionally not following 
published Jepp procedures 
1 
Unintentional crosswind technique 1 
Unintentional weather penetration 1 
Total 15 
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Aircraft Handling Sub-Error: Systems/Instrument/Radio 
The largest portion of Aircraft Handling errors belong to 
this category. Some of the notable events are detailed 
below. 
 Nav Frequencies/Displays: Cases where a 
frequency was not set or selected, or where a 
display was not used when appropriate. As an 
example, a crew briefed the visual approached, 
backed up by the NDB; the crew flew the visual 
approach, however the NDB remained tuned to 
another frequency. 
 System Tests: Several errors were logged where 
crews attempted to test the anti-skid braking system on the ATR while the aircraft was taxiing, which is potentially 
hazardous and can interfere with braking ability. 
 TCAS Selection: Several instances were observed where crews had different mode selections on their TCAS 
displays, and appeared to be unintentional. As one observer detailed, on a departure out of Thompson, “The Capt’s 
TCAS was set for 40NM (Normal) and the FO’s TCAS was set for 10NM (Down)”. While there is no existing policy 
on how crews should display TCAS information and crews are generally free to set the display as the situation 
warrants, it was notable that there were no discussion between the crews about why they had the selections up 
that they did and often the setting for takeoff was the setting that was used during the arrival on the previous leg. It 
is worth noting that the TCAS system will issue both Traffic (TA) and Resolution Advisories (RA) regardless of what 
is being displayed to the pilots. 
The TCAS system will not however issue TA/RA information or guidance when the system is not turned on. It was 
observed on two flights that crews noticed the TCAS was not turned on prior to departure. Both events occurred on 
the same aircraft (ATR42 C-FCIJ), which upon further review is the only ATR aircraft in the fleet which is not 
automatically activated and requires crew activation on each flight. It is also worth noting that the aircraft is a 
Freighter aircraft which operates in non-radar and uncontrolled airspace for the vast majority of its flying. 
 Incorrect Altimeter Settings: There were four instances where altimeters were set with the wrong altimeter 
setting, and thus displaying an inaccurate altitude. Three of these instances occurred during descent and in each 
case crews successfully trapped the error when it was caught in the Descent Checklist, or by reconfirming the 
correct setting with the FSS. The remaining instance occurred during the climb, was not trapped by the crew, and 
resulted in an altitude excursion. The crew was climbing to a cruising altitude of FL090 in northern domestic airspace 
and became distracted by a Master Caution alert; they failed to set their altimeters to 29.92 prior to level off, and 
subsequently leveled off 400ft above their cruise altitude. 
  
Table 26: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error – Systems/Instrument/Radio 
Systems/Instrument/Radio Frequency 
Other systems/inst/radio error 7 
Wrong altimeter settings 4 
Wrong TCAS setting 3 
Incorrect climb or descent callouts 2 
Wrong anti–ice setting 2 
Wrong nav radio frequency dialed 2 
Wrong ATC frequency dialed/selected 1 
Wrong Bug Settings 1 
Intentional Noncompliance – Other systems/inst/radio 
error 1 
Total 23 
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PROCEDURAL ERRORS 
Procedural Sub-Error: Briefing 
The errors in this category are interesting because they 
appear to speak to cultural norms that exist in the 
organization, particularly with respect to visual approaches. 
For reference, aircraft-specific SOPs at the time of the 
LOSA required that, (a) crews conduct approach briefings, 
and (b) and ‘AMORTS’-style approach briefing be 
conducted “when a visual approach is not assured”. No explicit guidance existed as to how crews were to conduct briefings 
for visual approaches. Recall from the sample descriptives that visual approaches represented 74% of the approaches 
observed in the LOSA and that the Captain and First Officer had flown together before in 88% of the flights sampled. Crews 
commonly abbreviated the approach briefing in these circumstances, as was noted by the observers: 
 “VFR for runway XX” 
 “The visual, backed up by the ILS” 
 “What I did yesterday…cross track to the left” 
Discussion during the data verification process challenged whether these could be considered as errors when crews did not 
have explicit guidance on visual approach briefing standards. The entries were upheld when the observer provided context as 
to how the practice presented additional risk to the flight. In multiple cases, visual approaches were briefed where IMC 
conditions prevailed on the approach (in one of these cases, weather at the destination was not available to the crew). 
Observers noted that crews omitted basic details of how the approach would be flown, i.e.; the transition to the final 
approach course, configuration, minimum altitudes, or contingency plans if weather turned out to the lower than expected. 
There was also a notable event where a crew was challenged by a transition/approach into an unfamiliar airport on while on a 
charter flight which lead them to a non-standard approach planning & briefing, though the situation resulted in an 
inconsequential outcome. 
“Crew picked up the ATIS for YQR; RNAV 31 approach was in use. Aircraft and crew were not certified for 
RNAV approach and the only other approach to that runway was an NDB. Crew became distracted 
discussing how to conduct the approach, and their transition to the approach. They briefed a ‘hybrid’ NDB 
RWY 31 approach, setting up the ILS to RWY 13 with hopes that a backcourse signal  would help them get 
better accuracy than an NDB only approach (no backcourse approach exists). While distracted with the 
approach briefing, the crew neglected to reduce the power and got an aircraft overspeed warning. The crew 
eventually called the field ‘visual’, and were cleared by ATC for a visual approach.” 
Procedural Sub-Error: Callout 
As detailed in the breakdown of this category, many errors 
were either the omission of a callout, or a pilot using an 
incorrect callout for the situation. 
 Omitted callouts: Some of these errors were 
simply calls that were not made, particularly in 
response to a callout by the other pilot, such as 
when leaving the current altitude for another, 
calling ‘clear right/left’ when taxiing from parking 
or across a runway/taxiway, or altitude awareness 
calls on approach.  
In 6 cases, altitude capture calls were omitted. Context provided by the observer identified distraction as a factor in 
each; in the final 1000ft to the level-off altitude, the crews had been reviewing scoop sheets, approach plates, 
completing logsheet entries, or engaged in non-essential conversation. In one case, the crew was in discussion with 
the Flight Attendant regarding problems with the lavatory door. While none of these omissions resulted in 
consequential outcomes, they reflect breakdowns workload management and task scheduling. 
 Incorrect callouts: The use of incorrect or substitute language or phraseology in callouts was noted. As an example, 
many crews replaced after landing/rollout calls (“my aircraft/my pole”) with phraseology used in aircraft they had 
Table 27: Procedural Sub-Error - Briefing 
Briefing  Frequency 
Incorrect/incomplete approach brief 3 
Intentional Noncompliance – Incorrect/incomplete 
approach briefing 2 
Omitted approach briefing 1 
Total 6 
Table 28: Procedural Sub-Error - Callout 
Callout  Frequency 
Other callout error 10 
Omitted altitude callouts 6 
Omitted climb or descent callouts 4 
Omitted approach callouts 3 
Incorrect climb or descent callouts 2 
Incorrect approach callouts 1 
Incorrect V–speed callouts 1 
Total 27 
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previously operated (“your pole/my pole”). Similar to omissions, the use of incorrect callouts did not result in any 
consequential outcomes, though they do reflect a deviation from standards published in SOPs. 
Procedural Sub-Error: Checklist 
This sub-category represents the 2nd most frequent crew 
error type in the sample. 
 Checklist interrupted: Interruptions were 
identified multiple times as threats to crews while 
completing checklists and briefings (the takeoff 
and approach briefings are items on the normal 
checklist), there is only one case logged where 
the observer felt that the crew mismanaged the 
threat. FSS called the flight to provide the crew 
with a departure clearance and a Captain stopped 
his takeoff briefing so that the FO could copy the 
clearance. When he was finished copying, the FO 
finished the Capt’s takeoff briefing for him and 
continued on with the checklist. 
 Checklist item deferred: There were events 
where a checklist item was differed so that the 
checklist could be completed out of sequence, 
with the intention of remembering to complete the deferred item later. In one instance, a crew elected to skip 
“Cabin Secure” (inconsequential) and in another, the crew deferred shutting off the bleed air to the cabin until the 
flight attendant had secured the cabin for departure (linked to additional error). The crew was required to depart with 
bleed valves off for performance reasons (ambient temperature); they forgot to deselect bleed air and took off with 
the bleed valves on. 
 Checklist completed from memory: The instances where this was observed were confined almost entirely to the 
“Before Takeoff/Line Up” and “Shutdown” checklists, evenly split. The only exception was one event where the 
“Taxi” checklist was completed from memory. 
Similar, one event was recorded where an engine was started before both crew members were in their seats, 
without any checklist being completed. 
The crew had just unloaded the aircraft and were clearly ready to get the return flight going; the 
aircraft was secured expeditiously. As both crew members were getting settled in their seats, the 
Captain initiated a start on engine #2 prior to any checklist being completed. This seemed like a 
normalized procedure; the FO did not intervene and was completely aware of what was 
happening. All normal checklists were completed prior to taxi. 
 QRH not referenced: Crews dealt with malfunctions (ACM pack fault, EFIS COMP-HDG, flap malfunction, DC GEN 
fault) without consulting the Quick Reference Handbook without any consequential outcomes. In one event however 
the crew not only neglected to reference the QRH following an APM fault – they elected to simply turn off the APM 
for the remainder of the flight. 
 Checklist omitted: The “Cruise” checklist/flow was the most frequently omitted checklist. There was only one 
other instance where the “Descent” checklist was forgotten by the crew until it was detected at 1400 ft AGL; the 
crew was operating a short sector with a 6000 ft cruise altitude. 
Procedural Sub-Error: Documentation 
The three errors logged in this subcategory relate to the 
following events: 
 “Proper C of G was not calculated prior to 
departure. Crew was radioed by CSAs with actual 
baggage location only after they had departed and 
were climbing out.” 
 “Flight plan accepted by Captain with incorrect aircraft configuration reflected (OEW & Index). Aircraft was in 42 seat 
config, flight plan showed them in 34 seats, this wasn't noticed until arrival 2 stations later.” 
 Table 29: Procedural Sub-Error - Checklist 
Checklist  Frequency 
Intentional Noncompliance – Checklist performed from 
memory 9 
Intentional Noncompliance – Self–initiated checklist (not 
called for by CA) 5 
Intentional Noncompliance – Omitted abnormal checklist 3 
Omitted abnormal checklist 3 
Omitted checklist 3 
Checklist performed late or at the wrong time 2 
Intentional Noncompliance – Checklist not performed to 
completion 2 
Intentional Noncompliance - Self-initiated checklist (not 
called for by PF) 2 
Intentional Noncompliance - Use of non-standard 
checklist protocol 1 
Intentional Noncompliance – Omitted checklist 1 
Missed checklist item 1 
Wrong response to a challenge on a checklist 1 
Other checklist error 1 
Total 34 
Table 30: Procedural Sub-Error - Documentation 
Documentation  Frequency 
Wrong weight and balance information recorded 1 
Misinterpreted items on flight documentation 1 
Other documentation error 1 
Total 34 
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 “The fuel slip was forgotten and therefore the fuel uplift was not able to be checked against the remaining fuel as 
written in the journey log. The first officer asked the captain if he got the fuel slip, however it was left in the fuel 
panel and the engines were already running.  It was retrieved after the flight.  The consequence was that the fuel 
uplift was not confirmed prior to departure other than checking the fuel gauges.” 
Procedural Sub-Error: PF/PNF Duty 
The dominant situation captured in this category by the 
observers occurred when the Pilot Flying (PF) made 
system, mode, or FMC selections while hand-flying the 
aircraft, rather than asking the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) to 
make the selections on their behalf. All of these events 
occurred in the Takeoff/Climb phase of flight, with most 
occurring just after takeoff and at low altitude. 
 “PF turned the heading bug and selected LNAV 
while hand flying and with no cross verification.” 
 “The Captain made inputs in the FMS and ADU while he was hand flying. The FO did not challenge him.” 
 “Just after rotation, PF asked for yaw damper to be engaged. PNF selected yaw damp, but nothing happened. The 
PF then reached up and pushed RESET on the ADU, but the yaw damp would still not engage. The PF continued to 
hand fly the departure, and the crew resumed trouble-shooting at 5000’ and engaged the autopilot. The crew was 
unsure of what caused the problem, but the autopilot and yaw damper were now engaged.” 
Procedural Sub-Error: SOP Cross Verification 
While observers coded these errors based on the context 
in which they watched them occur, the 22 errors in this 
category were associated with only 4 types of events: 
 Activation/Execution of FMC function: One pilot 
single-handedly makes changes to the flight plan 
in the FMC which affect (or will affect) the flight 
path of the aircraft. This was frequently 
associated with an ATC clearance (“Proceed 
direct BIRLA direct Winnipeg”) or when 
transitioning from enroute to approach by proceeding ‘direct’ to an approach fix. The other pilot may have been 
aware of the change without verbalizing it, however there were cases where the other pilot was preoccupied with 
other duties when the change was made. 
 Confirmation of altitude selection: The altitude preselector is set to a new altitude, but verbal confirmation is not 
made to remove any doubt that both pilots are aware of the new selection. Observed in all phases of flight. 
 Flight director/autopilot mode selection/change: Mode selections done without verbalization. Though both pilots 
may have been anticipating the selection, there were instances where the other pilot was ‘head’s down’ and 
otherwise preoccupied and did not observe the selection. In one event, the crew was preoccupied with an approach 
briefing as the autopilot correctly captured the selected altitude. The crew did not immediately notice the level-off, 
and therefore did not verbalize the automatic mode changes (ALT); the crew detected the situation just prior to the 
overspeed warning. 
 Crosscheck on receipt of new altimeter setting: Crew independently set their own altimeters on receiving a new 
altimeter setting, though no verbalization or crosscheck. Often the altimeters were correctly set, however in the 
event described below, an error was made and not immediately trapped by the crew: 
“ATC gave the crew the clearance, "Descend 5000, Winnipeg altimeter 29.77", and once the crew 
read this back, ATC advised, "fly your present heading, plan the NDB 18". All altimeters were set to 
the ATIS message of 29.81. While the Captain was reading back the descent clearance to ATC, the 
FO reset his altimeter to the updated 29.77 setting. The Captain had read back the clearances and 
set the altitude selector, but did not update his altimeter or the standby altimeter to the new 
setting. Approximately 3-4 minutes later, ATC gave a descent clearance to another company flight, 
including the altimeter setting. The Captain then crosschecked his own altimeter and updated to 
the new (29.77) setting, along with the standby altimeter and announced, "29.77" to which the FO 
acknowledged, but had already set.” 
Table 31: Procedural Sub-Error – PF/PNF Duty 
PF/PNF Duty Frequency 
PF makes own MCP/FCU changes 7 
PF makes own FMC/FMGC changes 3 
Intentional Noncompliance – PF makes own MCP/FCU 
changes 2 
Intentional Noncompliance – PF sets own flight controls 
or switches 1 
Intentional Noncompliance – PNF carried out PF duties 1 
z – Other PF/PNF duty error 1 
Total 15 
Table 32: Procedural Sub-Error – SOP Cross Verification 
SOP Cross Verification Frequency 
Failure to cross–verify FMC/FMGC inputs 10 
Failure to cross–verify MCP/FCU/altitude alerter changes 6 
Failure to cross–verify altimeter settings 2 
Intentional Noncompliance – Failure to cross–verify 
MCP/FCU/altitude alerter changes 
2 
Failure to cross–verify clearance 1 
Omitted flight mode annunciation 1 
Total 22 
 CAV LOSA | 2014 29 
 
Procedural Sub-Error: Other Procedural 
This subcategory is a collection of errors which are not 
captured in another procedural category. Most are 
independent and unique, and the more notable events are 
summarized below: 
 VFR flight in MVFR weather: ”Crew elected to 
fly VFR to destination with ceilings at 1000 AGL; 
the aircraft was flying in and out of the bottoms of 
the clouds during the cruise portion of the flight 
and had to identify and maintain separation from 
another aircraft inbound to destination at the 
same time.” (Earlier in this flight, the crew had 
detected that they had forgotten to turn the TCAS 
system on) 
 Emergency after takeoff: Crew encountered smoke in the cockpit immediately after takeoff. Memory items and 
smoke checklist from QRH done prior to acceleration altitude and before aircraft was cleaned up. Crew was 
challenged to remain organized and checklists were completed out of sequence and at inappropriate times. 
 System tests (system not installed): “Captain performed pre-flight check on a system that was not installed on the 
aircraft (cargo fire suppression). The FO informed the CA that the system was not installed on the aircraft and that 
testing the system would not do anything.” 
 MEL operational procedure mismanaged: “The crew forgot to delay the retraction of the landing gear in 
accordance with the MEL operational procedures associated with the brake temperature monitoring system being 
unserviceable.  The Captain realized their mistake after the gear was already raised.  The crew may have been 
distracted from a previous error where there was a misunderstanding of the ATC clearance just prior to departure.” 
 Crew direct CSA to aircraft with engines running: “Crew directed CSA to approach aircraft with both engines 
running to deliver paperwork. Passenger forgot Medical Papers in the terminal. Crew taxied back to the terminal and 
asked agent to pass the papers through the document door. Crew discussed shutting down #1 but agreed they 
would get a hot start if they did.  Crew briefed the ground agent and it was ok with her.” 
 Takeoff with APM off: “While taxiing out, crew got a Master Caution- Icing due to an APM Fault. The FO attempted 
a quick reset, but was unable to reset it. He asked the Capt if they would like to do the QRH, the Capt said "no, just 
turn it off". The rest of the flight was conducted with the APM off.” 
 Engine start (propeller brake) without marshaller: “CAPT started "#3" (engine with prop brake ON) without asking 
if the engine was clear from a marshaller or from the FO.  He did not run any checklist until after the engine was 
started.” 
There were however two issues which were logged on multiple flights: 
 FO brake test: “FO did not test his brakes during taxi checklist”; “Brake test not conducted by FO”. 
 Admin duties performed at inappropriate time (taxi): 
- “FO was "head's down" completing paperwork for entire taxi route, beginning on the runway and ending at 
the gate.” 
- “Completion of paperwork, and checking cell phone texts while taxiing in.” 
- “Logbook completed on the taxi; PNF "head's down" for entire taxi route.” 
- “FO completed logbook on the runway in the backtrack.” 
- “FO completing paperwork during ground taxi. Did not help in maintaining an active awareness on taxi in.” 
- “PNF made logbook entries while the aircraft was taxiing on the runway.” 
 
 
 
 
Table 33: Procedural Sub-Error – Other Procedural 
Other Procedural Frequency 
Other procedural error 10 
Duties performed at inappropriate time 8 
Intentional Noncompliance – Admin duties performed at 
inappropriate times 6 
Intentional Noncompliance – Other procedural error 6 
Intentional Noncompliance – Operation with unresolved 
aircraft malfunction 2 
Crew omitted cabin/flight attendant call 1 
Intentional Noncompliance – Failure to use proper WX 
SOP 1 
Intentional Noncompliance – Inappropriate taxi–in or out 
without wing walkers 1 
Wrong MEL action performed 1 
Total 36 
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COMMUNICATION ERRORS 
Procedural Sub-Error: Pilot to Pilot 
Sterile cockpit violations made up over 75% of the errors 
in this subcategory. Non-essential conversation was noted 
in all phases of flight at various altitudes below 10,000ft 
AGL. Crews appeared to manage conversations around 
radio calls and checklists with mostly inconsequential 
outcomes, although some crews committed callout errors 
which were linked. While most sterile cockpit errors were related to conversations, some were associated with non-essential 
tasks at inappropriate times: 
“As the aircraft was holding short of the departure runway, a noise could be heard over the intercom. The 
FO asked if everybody had turned off their cellphones. The Capt responded, "No, I think mine is still on" and 
then shut his off.” 
In one event, the Captain and First Officer appeared to be on ‘different pages’ with respect to their departure, as described by 
the observer below: 
“The crew was issued a HOLD SHORT clearance in their taxi instructions (Runway 13, W-F-P, HOLD 
SHORT Runway 18). The FO read this clearance back as the aircraft turned out of its parking position. As 
the crew was taxiing along FOXTROT, the Capt asked the FO about the hold short clearance, "We're 
supposed to hold on Papa?" The FO confirmed this for him. The Capt then responded, "I guess we're using 
13 today". This exchange suggested that neither pilot had discussed the departure runway with the other 
and both pilots may have been focused on other things as their began the taxi out (Capt taxiing aircraft, FO 
reading back clearance).” 
Procedural Sub-Error: Crew to External 
Several events were logged where a pilot responded to a 
similar callsign, or missed a call from ATS. In all of these 
events, the crew trapped the error, and it was usually the 
other pilot that detected the error. There were events 
where there was a mistinterpretation of ATC instructions 
with no consequential outcome: 
“ATC gave a speed restriction of "210 or less", 
The PNF read back "Calm Air XXX, slowing". 
Several minutes later, the PF asked the PNF if 
they were supposed to slow to 210kts or less, to which the PNF replied, "No, I think he just said '10 knots 
less'". ATC subsequently for speed reductions to 170kts, and finally to 150kts or less, which the PF 
complied with.” 
There were others however which were linked to additional flight crew errors: 
“First Officer wrote down the correct clearance (CYTH-CYWG FPR FL190) but then assumed the 
Thompson ONE departure was given, which it was not.  The captain queried the first officer’s 
understanding of the clearance but then accepted the FO’s understanding as correct.  LOSA observer told 
crew to clarify with ATC prior to taking off, at which point it was confirmed the Thompson ONE departure 
was not given and the correct altitude was selected in the ADU prior to departure.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34: Communication Sub-Error – Pilot to Pilot 
Pilot to Pilot  Frequency 
Intentional Noncompliance – Sterile cockpit violation 20 
Crew Miscommunication of Information 3 
Failure to communicate approach information 3 
Total 26 
Table 35: Procedural Sub-Error – Crew to External 
Crew to External Frequency 
Misinterpretation of ATC instructions 3 
Missed ATC calls 3 
Other crew to external communication error 3 
Intentional Noncompliance – Other crew to external 
communication error 2 
Crew omitted ATC call 1 
Wrong position report 1 
Wrong readbacks or callbacks to ATC 1 
Total 14 
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Summary 
The commission of errors between Captains and First Officers was nearly identical (42% and 41% respectively). Captains 
were more likely to commit checklist and PF/PNF duty errors, while First Officers were more likely to commit “other 
procedural” and systems/instrument/radio errors. 
 
Figure K: Error -“Who Caused it?” 
 
With respect to detecting errors that had been made, Captains were more 
likely to detect callout, crew-to-external communication and manual handling 
errors. First Officers were more likely to detect checklist, flight control and 
“other procedural” errors. Of the errors which were logged by observers, the 
Captain and First Officer detected only 30% of them; 65% of all errors went 
undetected by the flight crew. 
Figure L: Error -“Who Detected it?” 
Similarly, flight crews failed to respond to 
68% of the errors which were made. This 
could support the fact that the crew did not 
detect roughly the same proportion of 
errors. Crews took action by trapping 27% 
of errors and exacerbating the situation 
(making it worse) in 5.0% of errors. 
Despite the rates of detection and response 
by flight crews discussed above, nearly 
90% of errors resulted in inconsequential 
outcomes. Having said this, in 10 cases the 
crew made an additional error while 
managing the situation, and in 19 cases, 
crew action (or inaction) resulted in an 
undesired aircraft state.  
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Table 36: Error Descriptives 
Error Caused By Frequency 
First Officer 105 (42.3%) 
Captain 101 (40.7%) 
All Crew Members 35 (14.1%) 
Nobody 4 (1.6%) 
A/C Systems 2 (0.8%) 
Flight Attendant 1 (0.4%) 
Total 248 (100.0%) 
Error Detected By  
Nobody 161 (64.9%) 
Captain 35 (14.1%) 
First Officer 35 (14.1%) 
All Crew Members 10 (4.0%) 
LOSA Observer 4 (1.6%) 
ATC 2 (0.8%) 
A/C Systems 1 (0.4%) 
Total 248 (100.0%) 
Crew Response  
Failed to Respond 169 (68.1%) 
Trap 66 (26.6%) 
Exacerbate 13 (5.2%) 
Total 248 (100.0%) 
Outcome  
Inconsequential 219 (88.3%) 
Undesired Aircraft State 19 (7.7%) 
Additional Error 10 (4.0%) 
Total 248 (100.0%) 
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A review of the altitude at which errors occurred reveals the prevalence of errors made at lower altitudes. Much the same as 
was noted with threats, the vast majority of errors were made below 10,000ft (78%), with (38%) occurring on the ground, 
suggesting that error commission rates are higher near the beginning and near the end of flights. 
 
Figure M: Error Prevalence by Altitude 
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UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATES 
LOSA UAS prevalence and findings are detailed below by phase of flight and tabulated by sub-category. 
 
Table 37: Undesired Aircraft States 
UAS Prevalence  Frequency 
Aircraft Handling 96% (22)   
Ground Navigation 0% (0)   
Incorrect A/C Configuration 4% (1)   
Total  100% (23) 
 
LOSA observers recorded a total of 23 undesired aircraft states over the course of 83 observations, an average of 0.28 UASs 
per flight (one UAS for every 3 flights). All but 3 undesired aircraft states occurred in the Descent/Approach/Landing phase of 
flight: there was one UAS associated with an Incorrect Aircraft Configuration and the remainder were all related to Aircraft 
Handling. 
 
Figure N: UAS Prevalence by Phase of Flight 
 
 
Figure O: Top UAS Bar Graph 
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UAS Sub-Category: Aircraft Handling 
The most frequent Aircraft Handling UAS observed was 
unstable approach, which is discussed in more detail 
below. High Speed and Vertical Deviations were the 
second most frequent, followed by several events which 
were only observed once each. Due to the low number 
and relatively higher risk of undesired aircraft states, each 
are detailed below. 
 “The crew descended below the 25nm safe 
altitude and below published procedure turn 
altitudes and levelled off at 1400 feet ASL (700 feet AGL) approximately 7nm from the airport. 
The weather in [destination] turned out not to be VFR. It was overcast at approximately 900-1000 feet with good 
visibility. The crew descended below the 25nm safe altitude and below published procedure turn altitudes and 
levelled off at 1400 feet ASL (700 feet AGL) approximately 7nm from the airport on the inbound approach track. The 
GPWS issued a terrain warning as the aircraft approached 1400 feet. The aircraft had broken out of the clouds 
around 1600 feet and the crew had ground contact at the time of the warning.” 
 “Aircraft was significantly above the intended vertical path during the descent, necessitating a descent angle outside 
of normal operations (4.1 degrees). Crew was able to re-capture the desired vertical path with reverting to a lower 
level of automation.” 
 “Crew leveled off 400' above desired altitude during climb. As opposed to descending to initial altitude, crew elected 
to keep climbing to FL110. Uncontrolled airspace, no violation.” 
 “Excess power led to aircraft overspeed clacker detecting the condition. PF reduced power, and shallowed the 
descent to recover.” 
 “Aircraft high on approach. Aircraft remained "all white" on the PAPIs until short final.” 
 “The tailwind was noted at 10 knots on short final. Flare was initiated at Vref+10 although the aircraft had achieved 
approach slope by short final. Due to tailwind and fast approach, most of the runway was used. Crew used more 
reverse and braking than normal.” 
 “The aircraft was briefly oversped through flight level 185 on descent.” 
 “Aircraft banked away from desired flight path when autopilot was engaged. Heading bug wasn't aligned with 
runway, so aircraft banked once AP was engaged. Crew accepted the deviation and continued.” 
 “VMO overspeed. PF immediately reduced the torque. No verbal response.” 
 “Crew Flew though a CB. The Crew was distracted by the FA, and Approach Briefing. There was no communication 
between PF and PNF on the ADU changes.  All this resulting in the Aircraft flying through a CB creating an 
unnecessarily bumpy ride.” 
 “PF lost directional control due to incorrect aileron inputs for the cross-wind on the Landing rollout.  Captain quickly 
took control and recovered the aircraft.” 
 “VMO Overspeed protection engaged in descent. PF reduced thrust and corrected the fault.” 
UAS Sub-Category: Incorrect Aircraft Configuration 
During data verification, the steering committee elected to 
include an event within this sub-category based on the 
UAS defining criteria which says that a UAS “occurs when 
the flight crew places the aircraft in a situation of 
unnecessary risk” and “can also occur as a result of 
equipment malfunction” (ICAO, 2002, p.2-4). 
In this event, the crew received information from the flight crew handing the aircraft over to them about a possible issue with 
the air conditioning system. Based on the information that they had at the time, and after consulting Maintenance personnel, 
the crew departed with the anticipation that they would be able to control cabin temperature, however the situation increased 
risk to the passengers and crew. 
Table 38: UAS Sub-Category – Aircraft Handling 
Aircraft Handling Frequency 
Unstable Approach 10 
Vertical Deviation 4 
High Speed Deviation 4 
Lateral Deviation 1 
Long Landing 1 
Off Centerline Landing 1 
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 1 
Total 22 
Table 39: UAS Sub-Category – Incorrect Aircraft Configuration 
Incorrect Aircraft Configuration Frequency 
Incorrect systems/instruments/radio configuration 1 
Total 1 
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"Once airborne the temperature in the cockpit only got hotter. FA was notified of the problem and that crew 
was unable to control it, the FA was going to monitor it and keep the pilots notified of the situation. Pilots 
worked with maintenance on the radio and discussed options of what to do; LOSA Observer was asked to 
contribute as a crew member and assisted in reviewing the QRH, resetting breakers, etc. 
FA called to say people were sweating in the back, one passenger was not feeling well due to the heat. At 
this point the crew decided they could not continue the flight due to health reasons and diverted back to 
Winnipeg (Approximately 50N of YWG).  The cockpit was unbearable at this point, the temp was pegged at 
35+ degrees, and switches were hot to the touch.  Crew discussed options of cooling the cabin as there 
are no SOP or QRH direction for this, one bleed was shut off to reduce the hot airflow but maintain 
pressurization. The crew did a good job maintaining control of the aircraft, the PF directed jobs to the PNF 
and myself.  Considering the situation and extreme heat, everyone focused on the task at hand. 
Visual approach was completed and kept in tighter than normal to get the passengers on the ground as 
quickly as possible and start ventilating the cabin and cockpit of the extreme heat.” 
 
Unstable Approach Breakdown 
Stabilized approach criteria are published in Standard Operating Procedures for all aircraft types (ATR42/72, Dornier 328JET, 
Hawker Siddely HS748). Current policy requires states that “All Calm Air aircraft must be on a stabilized approach profile by 
1000 feet AGL and must remain within these parameters until touchdown. Any deviation from a stabilized approach profile 
MUST result in a missed approach.” 
Ten approaches were logged for being outside at least one element of the stabilized approach criteria. Each unstable 
approach is detailed on the following page. High speed events were the most common deviations observed, and in all but 
two cases, the approaches were flown in VMC.  A go-around was not conducted in any of the events logged. 
 
Table 40: Approaches Outside of Stabilized Approach Criteria 
Calm Air Stabilized Approach Criteria Approaches  Outside of Criteria 
1. Aircraft is continuously in a normal position to land and only small changes in 
heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct flight path 2 
2. Aircraft speed is not more than VAPP (Vref) + 20KIAS and not less than VAPP 
(Vref) 5 
3. Aircraft is in the correct landing configuration. 1 
4. Sink rate is no greater than 1000 fpm, if an approach requires greater than 1000 
fpm, a special briefing must be conducted 2 
5. Power setting appropriate for the approach configurations. - 
6. All briefings and checklists have been completed - 
7. ILS approaches must be within one dot of the localizer and glideslope. - 
8. On circling approaches wings must be level by 300 feet AGL - 
9. Non-precision approaches must be within 10° of course - 
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Figure O: Unstable Approach 
 
 
Table 41: Unstable Approach Descriptions 
Obs 
ID 
Aircraft 
Type 
Pilot 
Flying 
Recovery 
Altitude Observer Description 
12 ATR42 Captain 500ft Crew levelled off at 700 feet AGL without the aircraft being configured to land. The crew 
continued the approach and did not initiate a go-around. 
Flaps 15 and gear down were selected approximately 5nm from the airport at 700 feet above 
ground. Flaps 30 was select 500 feet above ground. Airspeed control was good on the 
approach once the aircraft was configured. Despite the airspeed control being good, the 
approach was not stable because of the very late selection of flaps. 
17 ATR42 First Officer 300ft Earlier in the approach, the PNF stated to the PF that “you better get down your very high”.  
The PF selected 1000FPM in the VS select on the autopilot, this was not enough to regain 
slope, the PF turned off the autopilot and hand flew.   
Decent rate was about 1400fpm until 1 mile final 300ft AGL.  At this time a normal approach 
was maintained. 
23 ATR42 First Officer 900ft Approach speed was up to VRef+25, but was corrected at 900 feet AGL. 
39 ATR42 Captain 600ft Tight base to final on visual approach 
Outside of stabilized approach criteria at 600. Crew continued approach to landing. 
40 ATR42 First Officer 500ft Airspeed on approach was in the VRef + 25-30 range between 1000 AGL and 500 AGL, but 
was within VRef-VRef+20 by 500 AGL. 
41 ATR42 Captain 500ft Descent was flown at high speed. Rate of descent was 1400 fpm down through 1000 ft AGL 
and was corrected to less than 1000 FPM by 500 ft AGL. 
113 ATR42 First Officer 500ft VRef+30 down until roughly 500' AGL 
Entered stabilized approach criteria through roughly 500' AGL. Aircraft was a freighter 
returning empty. 
115 ATR42 First Officer 200ft Aircraft was VRef+45 at 400' // +40 at 300' // +15 at 150'. (ATR72, empty) 
121 ATR42 First Officer 300ft The crew conducted a contact approach in VMC by flying towards the FAF for CYFO RNAV 
18. The aircraft passed abeam the airport at Vmo.  As the aircraft was approaching the fix at 
Vmo, the FMS calculated the rate of closure and initiated a turn to final much too early.  
The ADU was selected to HDG mode to compensate and the aircraft was navigated on final 
approach directly to the threshold from this early-turn point. This resulted in an approach path 
that was laterally offset from centerline by 30 degrees.  
The aircraft was not on centerline until 1NM final.  All other criteria for stable approach were 
met. 
122 ATR42 Captain 900ft The aircraft did not meet stable approach criteria (Vref +20) until 900 feet AGL. The UAS was 
not detected and the approach continued normally. 
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Summary 
Captains and First Officers were responsible for causing an equal number of 
undesired aircraft states, and were responsible for an equal proportion of 
unstable approaches. 
Most events went undetected by the flight crew, as perceived by the LOSA 
observer.  Considering the number of high speed deviations and lower altitude 
configurations that make up the unstable approach events, it could be 
suggested that both pilots were aware and/or comfortable about the condition 
of the aircraft at that moment; because they took no action, the observer 
would have logged this as not being detected. Of 10 unstable approaches, 
only one was detected by the crew. 
Despite not being detected, most UASs were mitigated by the crew and 
resulted in recovery. 
A review of the altitude at which UASs occurred reveals the prevalence at 
lower altitudes. Much the same as was noted with threats and errors, the vast 
majority occurred below 10,000ft (87%), with (70%) occurring below 1000ft 
AGL. 
 
 
 
Figure P: UAS Prevalence by Altitude 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 42: UAS Descriptives 
UAS Caused By Frequency 
Captain 10 (44%) 
First Officer 11 (48%) 
All Crew Members 1 (4%) 
A/C Systems 1 (4%) 
Total 23 (100.0%) 
Error Detected By  
Nobody 13 (57%) 
Captain 5 (22%) 
First Officer 0 (0%) 
All Crew Members 4 (17%) 
A/C Systems 1 (4%) 
Total 23 (100.0%) 
Crew Response  
Mitigate 17 (74%) 
Failed to Respond 6 (26%) 
Additional Error 0 (0%) 
Total 23 (100.0%) 
Outcome  
Recovery 18 (78%) 
End State/Incident/Accident 5 (22%) 
Additional Error 0 (0%) 
Total 23 (100.0%) 
Pre-Departure/Taxi Takeoff/Climb Cruise Descent/Approach/Land Taxi/Park 
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CREW QUESTIONNAIRE  
LOSA observers offered crews the opportunity to respond to a set of questions about the operation. These were normally 
conducted verbally during a low workload portion of the cruise segment, or on the ground at the end of the flight. Crew 
responses are offered below as they were recorded by Observers. 
Training: Is there a difference in how you were trained and the reality of line operations? If so, why? 
 Roughly half of the responses were directed towards training and use of the FMS on the ATR fleet. Some of their 
comments are quoted below: 
- “There is very little FMS covered in the training and none in the simulator training.” 
- “Yes there is a difference because there is no FMS in the simulator.  The reality of line operations vs sim 
training is very different because of this.” 
- “FMS use in the plane versus none in the sim. Not trained for any FMS use, and especially irregular ops. Sim 
training seems foreign with heavy emphasis on NDB approaches, but I have yet to do one on the line.” 
- “The captain was very adamant in stating that the ATR pilots are flying online differently than what is expected 
(according to regulations) when it comes to approaches in the north.  There are many times when full procedure 
circling approaches should be conducted according to regulations, but a straight in approach using GPS fixes is 
done instead (since it is considered safer and more efficient). Since the ATR is not certified for GPS approaches 
(and do not have those approaches in the database), this is not according to the COM or SOPs but is common 
practice.” 
- “Why are full procedure approached trained for new FOs in the sim but immediately discouraged during line 
indoc by line indoc captains? Training does not line up with the reality of line operations. FMS isn’t touched 
during training. The first time a new FO sees the FMS is on line indoc. Use of true heading in NDA is ignored 
because the aircraft are incapable of satisfactory precession levels.” 
 Remarks were made about the way that stalls were described in the SOPs compared to the way that they are trained in 
the simulator. 
 Finally, several crews offered comments about a lack of structure in line indoctrination training, and incomplete exposure 
to all of Calm Air operations (fuel/freighters/arctic/scheduled pax). 
Standardization: How standardized are other crews that you fly with? If there’s a lack of standardization, 
what do you think is (are) the reason(s)? 
 Mostly standardized, though there are variations. Some responses alluded that crews can be selectively standardized 
when they want or need to be. 
 As this question was asked to a crew, each member offered their thoughts, which often differed based on their seat. 
Captains noted that FOs were mostly standardized, while FOs noted that some Captains often have their own 
procedures or habits for certain situations, such (i.e.; “some Captains call for a checklist, others just expect you to start 
it”). One Captain suggested that standardization was excellent with junior FOs, but that FOs with more experience often 
developed their own habits. 
 Most crews pointed to SOPs as a key reason for variation in standards. 
- SOPs sometimes too vague, open to interpretation 
- Incorrect, not updated in several years (e.g. APM, PF/PNF responsibilities for ADU [ATR]) 
- SIM Instructors train SOPs, then Line Training Captains train to ignore SOPs that don’t work in the real world 
 Crews also cited certain “quirks” that crews imported from other aircraft types which did not apply to their current 
aircraft type. 
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  Automation: What are the most significant automation catches (traps) for this aircraft? 
 [ATR] “There is no clear SOP for switching from a HEADING to a NAV situation (i.e.; ATC vectors, then 
'cleared on course).(1) some people fly in HDG mode and then arm NAV mode.(2) Some people set up FMS 
HDG CMD, then arm NAV.” 
 [ATR] “Mode select stuff, when to do it, how to do it properly.” 
 [D328] “As the jet transitions into ASEL, if you move the pitch wheel, auto pilot goes into "PIT" mode and 
will descend or climb through selected altitude.” 
 [ATR] “PUSDO ILS in dual FMS.  PNF/PF confusion over who does what on the ADU, heading bug, course 
bar.  SOP's should be more like the jet where the PF owns the panel when the autopilot is on, and the PNF 
owns it when the PF is hand flying.” 
 [ATR] “The most significant trap for this aircraft is that people are not being properly trained on the use of 
the FMS.  No real operational training and no FMS training in the simulator (no FMS instrument procedures 
training device that can be used by crews).” 
 [ATR] “Different FMS configurations among the fleet. No fleet standardization, and not differences training 
is provided.” 
Overall Safety Improvements? 
 Flight Ops 
 Equipment - Crews cited aircraft equipment issues as opportunities for improvement: 
- “It would be nice to see laser gyros put into the aircraft, EFIS COMP faults are often ignored and will 
one day cause major issues. Significant terrain and irregular compass readings make for an accident in 
the making to crews not intimately familiar.” 
- “RNAV approval. The single greatest safety improvement is sorely overdue.” 
- “Request made to standardize the center pedestal layout of the ATR fleet to the greatest extent 
possible. (FMS installed in center for single FMS installations; radios and panels laid out in the same 
configurations).” 
 Ground Support – Crews discussed inconsistent availability of marshallers at ground stations, and inconsistent 
loading of aircraft to the point where it is difficult to open the cockpit door due to bulging cargo nets. Pilots also 
felt that having to pass along commissary lists over the radio increased their workload near the end of their 
flights. 
 Resources – Comments were related to how resources were assigned to tasks that they felt was important to 
the operation. 
- “Resources!  A couple people can only do so much.  "Old school" mentality vs. "new school."” 
- “Flight Ops does not devote enough resources to the ATR. The Jet program seems to have all the 
attention when it is only 15% of the company. We need a dedicated manager to take care of the ATR 
the way that the CP has done for the jet.” 
 Fatigue Management – Many crews responded strongly to this issue. They felt that there was a need to 
improve the safety culture with respect to fatigue management. This ranged from general staffing levels and 
high monthly credit averages, suggesting that crews would report to work unfit for duty, to more specific flight 
duty assignments. 
- “Flt Ops needs to look at fatigue management with pairings and adding flights at the end of the day to 
guys.  Fatigue is a huge issue at CA, doing max amount of flying with bare minimum crews.”   
- “Need to stop scheduling crews for 14 hour duty days on paper when everyone knows that the day 
will never get completed forcing crews to feel the need to extend days, rush, etc, we are doomed from 
the start.” 
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 Dispatch – Some crews noted that their interactions with Flight Dispatch were good, and that they were showing 
improvement. Others cited more specific challenges and areas for improvement: 
 Crews expressed a lack of confidence in their Flight Dispatcher at times, citing high turnover and challenges 
with quality control. They also expressed an expectation that Flight Dispatch should be “a step ahead of 
them” when they landed at their next destination with respects to loads, performance planning, weather, 
etc. 
 Communications: Language barriers with Flight Dispatchers who are not primary English speakers, creating 
opportunities where things are lost in translation. Also cited communication with other stakeholders, such 
as cargo and operations coordination where there is sometimes a disconnect (e.g. more Flight Dispatcher 
input on load control). 
 Airport – Crews shared their thoughts on issues related to company operations, airport infrastructure and ATS 
support. 
 “There is no one at fishing lodges to provide safe passage to and from the aircraft on the ramp or runway in 
some cases.  I have been there and people are all over the place.” 
 “LED Airport lights are awesome.” 
 “Poor CARs hours in the high arctic” 
 “More VASI/PAPI in northern Manitoba. Better winter maintenance with CRFI info. More GPS approached if 
we ever get certified.” 
 “We need better knowledge of runways conditions, CRFI and RSC would be nice for all airports.” 
 “There is no weather or altimeters at certain arctic airports on weekends or after hours. How do we 
conduct our jobs safely?” 
 “Northern Manitoba (ie Oxford House, etc) should have current CRFI/RSC (not from the day before).  Also, 
how can Gillam provide CRFI and others cannot?  Having more VASIS/PAPIs installed would be helpful.  
Calm Air should be an advocate for change for these things.” 
 Air Traffic Control  
 “YTH ONE departure needs to be always or never. It causes confusion and is random” 
 “In YTH, give us the TH one departure all the time or never.  Someone is going to or maybe has busted the 
departure procedure because it’s so random when we get cleared it.  Its should be standard like Winnipeg.  
When cleared flight plan route, crews need to be careful with what dispatch files us (ie. YQD, Ambil, 
YWG)” 
 “A Churchill SID would be nice on IFR days.” 
 “At or below 15,000' 30nm North of YWG is a restriction that is irregularly applied, tough descent planning, 
and ATC always gets mad, even though it's not published anywhere.” 
 “The 50N waypoint from YYQ-YEK is crap. Some operators don't use it, sometimes ATC clears you direct. 
Just have a procedure with CZWG Centre that YYQ-YEK even altitudes, YEK-YYQ odd altitudes.” 
 “YYQ 357 50DME transition is dangerous, planes are climbing and descending at one spot with radio 
changes- AMBIL crossing at 15,000ft or below is often left until the transfer to arrival when its often too 
late, this should always be given to us.” 
 “An arrival should be built for approaching Winnipeg from the north.  They’re always expect 15000' at 30 
nm north of Winnipeg but it's not published.” 
 “Arrival in to YWG to better plan descents and load approaches. Should be using arrivals in to YWG on 
every leg. Is ATC not aware we can do them? They don't even give it to us when we file them.” 
 SOPs  
 Crews offered specific suggestions: 
- [ATR] “42 checklists need APM Addition of a “line” in initial prestarts and enroute checklist prior to 
doors and hatches.” 
- [ATR] “ATR checklists need a review. There are items missing that should be included. Ex: APM is 
not included in SOPs or in Checklists.” 
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- [ATR] “Captain should always advance the power levers, FO's should always set the power as the 
captain is trying to keep the plane straight on the runway, not looking inside the cockpit” 
- [ATR] ”Stalls/Fire on departure/profile diagrams in the SOPs are wrong.” 
- [ATR] “"5 Up" calls aren't necessary. No reason AP can't be used below 5,000'” 
- Confusion about application of stabilized approach criteria (IMC vs. VMC, circling) 
- Confusion about application of company memos on SOPs 
 As well as suggestions more general in nature: 
- “SOP's need to reflect what we are really doing on the line, and in training.” 
- “Any amendment since inception has been clerical in nature and with little to no line input!” 
- “Need a committee ( not just office people who may not fly on a regular basis)” 
- “More amendments. NOTHING has changed in the 5 years I have been on this plane.” 
 
General comments and feedback about the LOSA observation 
 The Captain was positive regarding the LOSA experience and his only comment is that he looks forward to the 
results. 
 Crew was optimistic that the LOSA process will improve safety at Calm Air, by identifying higher risk areas of the 
operation. 
 Generally speaking the LOSA was very well received and the crew felt it was a good step forward. They are hoping it 
will improve safety and efficiency.  The FO felt the observations would be biased as everyone would be on their best 
behavior. 
 The Captain does endorse the concept of LOSA but was very upset about the company decision to implement this in 
the summer during a very busy time when monthly credits are high.  The Captain was about to refuse the 
observation to help prove his point to the company, but changed his mind.  
 “LOSA should not be conducted when all pilots are working crazy amounts, 100+ credits a month, called on most 
GDO's etc . Good program, happy to see something proactive for a change.” 
 “Eye opening, good program, look forward to seeing the results and final report. Some guys might treat the LOSA as 
a line check and change the way the fly for the LOSA, because of this results may be off” 
 They both were supportive of the LOSA program, but not happy it was started during a very busy time with high 
credits for everyone. Also, did mention that at times they may have done things incorrectly just because of the 
"nervousness" of being watched. 
 Crew was positive and supportive of the LOSA. Once crew member feared that some pilots would treat an 
observation as a line check and be on their best behavior...negating some of the valuable findings that might be out 
there. 
 “Appreciate the time effort and money the company is putting into this program.  Hopefully the company does 
something with the results, most of the issues have been happening for a long time and management is aware, they 
were just swept under the rug or ignored in the past.” 
 “good program, it’s nice to see something proactive rather than always being reactive.  Happy its being done.” 
 Possibly could have been conducted at a better time (IE. when crews were less busy) 
 “Need a focused LOSA for freight/fuel hauls. Don't feel that the reality of the work I do is being observed. Lots of 
threats outside of the normal area of operations. Concerns about one AME working 24hrs in NW Ontario. Potential 
for fatigue during de-ice, etc...Lack of loadmasters is causing concern about employee injury.” 
 The captain and FO were both positive about the observation experience and glad to have an observer on board. 
They seemed hopeful that the data collected would help out the company. 
 "This is my 4th observation" (FO) 
 The crew felt that LOSA was a positive addition to our company, and were looking forward to the results. 
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 Overall perception of the LOSA is good. Crews welcomed it and were eager to see the results. They had nothing 
more to add. 
 Pleasant experience and hope good data can be captured.  Doubtful that the data will be acted upon by senior 
management. 
 “We are skeptical that the company will effect actual change based on this LOSA program but we hope the 
managers make actual change to improve everything.: 
 “Why not do LOSA on Hawker, bulk fuel, or others types of flights instead of mostly scheduled flights?” 
 “I think LOSA is a good idea.” 
 “great program, sad to hear guys are getting turned down from some flights, hopefully CA does something with the 
results.” 
 CAV LOSA | 2014 43 
 
DISCUSSION 
This section of the report offers discussion on some of the trends that were found in the data. 
Comparisons by Aircraft Type 
The sampling plan attempted to capture observations from each aircraft type in proportion with the number of annual flying 
hours of each type, and was a logistical limitation of the LOSA. Because of this, fleet summary information is provided in 
Table 43 as advisory information only, and the bottom ‘CAV Fleet’ line reflects the normalized Calm Air data across all types. 
 
Table 43: LOSA TEM Fleet Summary 
Fleet Threat Error UAS 
Threat 
Frequency 
(per sector) 
Error 
Frequency 
(per sector) 
UAS 
Frequency 
(per sector) 
ATR42 
(51 Obs) 109 144 16 2.14 2.83 0.31 
ATR72 
(15 Obs) 31 61 4 2.07 4.07 0.27 
Dornier 328JET 
(17 Obs) 44 43 3 2.59 2.53 0.18 
       
CAV Fleet  
(83 Obs) 184 248 23 2.22 2.99 0.28 
 
While making comparisons between fleet types is not statistically appropriate due to the low sample size, a meaningful 
variation of events between aircraft types was not observed; that is to say that the events appeared to occur in roughly the 
same proportion regardless of the aircraft type. While the error rate for the ATR72 appears higher than the ATR42 and 
D328JET, the number of observations (15) is too few to suggest that those errors did not simply occur by random chance. 
Having said this, it is worthy to ask ourselves whether crews are more likely to commit errors while flying the ATR72 given 
that crews are rated on both that ATR42 and ATR72, that the ATR72 was introduced to the fleet 5 years after the introduction 
of the ATR42, that the ATR72 accounts for less than half of the total ATR fleet (2 aircraft dedicated to freighter ops) and that 
most crews likely fly the ATR42 more frequently than the ATR72. Again, statistically we cannot say that more errors were 
observed in this LOSA, though it could be indicative of a trend. 
 
Visual Approach Briefings 
Current SOP for ATR42 and ATR72 is that an approach briefing is required “any time that a visual approach is not assured”. 
SOP for the D328JET was amended shortly after introduction of the aircraft to the fleet requiring that an AMORTS-style 
approach briefing is required for all approaches, VMC or IMC. 
Briefing errors were noted in some detail in the Error section of this report (see p.26), and noted that crews often abbreviated 
briefings in visual conditions. The discussion also cited the high prevalence of visual conditions on approach, and the high 
frequency of Captain/First Officer having flown together before. This high degree of familiarity with the crew, the conditions 
and the airport likely supports the crew’s habits to abbreviate approach briefings down to “VFR for 24” or “the visual, backed 
up by the ILS”. Having said this, in reviewing the unstable approaches within the sample one might wonder if both pilots 
understood completely how the other was planning the flight path of the aircraft, speeds and configuration changes, runway 
exit point, etc. Greater detail may have driven the PNF to speak up when his/her mental model of the approach no longer 
matched the aircraft’s position, path or configuration, prompting corrections or a go-around by the PF. 
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Approach Briefings & Descent Checklist 
Observers noted that slightly more than half (58%) of crews conducted their approach briefing prior to the top-of-descent 
(TOD). Previous LOSA studies (Sumwalt, Thomas, & Dismukes, 2002) have found that crews who brief after the TOD commit 
60% more errors during the descent/approach/landing phase than their counterparts. In the CAV LOSA, we found only a 13% 
increase in errors during the same phase if the crew briefed after the TOD. When considering this figure it should also be 
worth noting that crews conducted approaches in VMC conditions 83% of the time and flew a visual approach 74% of the 
time. The error rate may have been higher if more non-precision or precision approaches were flown in IMC conditions, such 
as would be prominent during certain times of year in our area of operations. 
An interesting theme developed when comparing the Observer’s narratives of the Descent/Approach/Landing phase which 
suggests multiple interpretations of approach briefing practices and checklist use. 
Fleet SOPs provide expectations for the contents of IFR approach briefings, though they do not explicitly discuss at what 
point in the flight they should be completed. On each aircraft type, initiation of the Descent Checklist occurs when crossing 
through 18,000ft in the descent. The final checklist item on the ATR fleet (3rd final on the D328) is “APPROACH 
BRIEFING…..COMPLETE”. 
Observers noted that some crews anticipated higher workload in the descent phase, and elected to brief the approach during 
cruise, nearing the TOD while their workload was still low. In these cases, when the crew reached “APPROACH BRIEFING” 
in the Descent Checklist, the PF stated “COMPLETE” as to indicate that it had been completed. Other crews conducted their 
approach briefing when directed to by the checklist; that is, when they reached “APPROACH BRIEFING”, they would 
“COMPLETE” it at that point. 
An approach briefing is a common task required by the PF and is routinely completed in less than 2 minutes. During the 
descent phase, aircraft are generally descending at rates be 2000-2500 feet per minute, suggesting that while the PF is 
completing an approach briefing, the aircraft can descent through up to 4000-5000 feet of airspace. The task becomes more 
complex when it is interrupted by ATC instructions, interphone calls from the Flight Attendant, or aircraft navigation tasks, 
which may occur with greater frequency at lower altitudes. 
 
Figure Q: Approach Briefing Windows 
 
This scenario is illustrated in Figure Q, which depicts an aircraft cruising at FL240. A profile for an aircraft cruising at FL340 
(D328), as well as a profile for an aircraft at FL120 (ATR42 in Northern Domestic Airspace) have been included as well. The 
latter reflects a particular challenge, as the checklist is only initiated at TOD 11,000 feet AGL in most areas, where the 
checklist and approach briefing can take up a meaningful amount of altitude. The regions where approach briefings were 
being conducted as a checklist ‘DO’ item are displayed by ‘A’. While it is not against company policy to complete the briefings 
in these areas, and while LOSA did not reflect significantly higher error rates when they were conducted here, lower risk 
regions displayed by ‘B’ represent low workload areas where many crews (58%) elected to conduct their briefings. 
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While in no case was this briefing practice logged as an error, it did bring attention to the multiple interpretations of the 
Descent Checklist. This is an area worthy of further review. 
 
Intentional Noncompliance Errors 
Knowledge of areas of intentional noncompliance is valuable because it can help to assess the degree of procedural drift in 
the operation and the areas where it occurs. A better understanding can help identify weak or misunderstood procedures, or 
areas where crews have truly found a better way to accomplish a task. It may also identify a normalization of deviance, where 
the norm has drifted over time for any number of reasons, to the to the point that crews are being exposed to risks through to 
be mitigated. Industry data has shown that on flights without intentional noncompliance errors, the crew see 2.1 errors per 
flight. On flights where the crew commits a single act of intentional noncompliance, the error rate climbs to 3.9 per flight, and 
where there are two or more acts of intentional noncompliance, the error rate jumps to 7.5 per flight (Werfelman, 2013). 
The LOSA Collaborative is a private organization which supports airlines completing LOSAs by conducting much of the data 
management and analysis. The organization’s founder was one of the original developers of LOSA at the University of Texas 
in the 1990s. As a result of many years collecting de-identified data, their robust database contains more than 20,000 
observations from more than 70 airlines around the world (Werfelman, 2013) and allows for comparison against the airlines 
(collectively) which have also completed LOSAs. Some of this data has been made public through various industry 
publications. 
A comparison below is made between common intentional noncompliance errors found in the LOSA Collaborative’s archive, 
and the top 5 intentional noncompliance errors logged in the Calm Air LOSA.  
 
Table 44: Common LOSA Intentional Noncompliance Errors 
LOSA Collaborative Archive (Werfelman, 2013) Calm Air LOSA 2014 (Top 5) 
 Omitted Altitude Callouts 1. Sterile Cockpit Violation  
 Checklist Performed from Memory 2. Checklist Performed from Memory  
 Failure to Execute a Mandatory Missed Approach 3. Admin Duties Performed at Inappropriate Times 
 PF Making Flight Guidance Changes while Hand Flying 4. Self-Initiated Checklist 
 Taxi Duties Performed While Aircraft is Still on Runway 5. PF Makes Own MCP/FCU changes 
 
Greater awareness among crews of intentional noncompliance zones in their normal flight routines, along with more targeted 
enforcement during flight training and line checks could lead to more disciplined flight deck compliance. 
 
Checklist & Briefing Interruptions 
A great value of the LOSA process has been the ability to identify sequences of events which present risk to a situation which 
had appeared to be normally benign or irrelevant. All Observers were active, line-qualified pilots who likely did not necessarily 
see the situation as a threat from their crew seat in the moment, but from the jumpseat and free from cockpit tasks could 
readily identify it as a threat.  
Crews dealt routinely with the interruption of a checklist or a briefing while in the Pre-Departure/Taxi phase, and frequently at 
uncontrolled airports. There were often two interruptions: one when FSS would radio the crew with their IFR clearance, and 
one when the Flight Attendant called the crew to advise “Cabin Secure”. 
The sequence of events for crews who commonly do multiple legs per day in and out of uncontrolled airports is very familiar 
to them. From the LOSA narratives, there is a sense that crews are primarily focused on the tasks to be completed internally 
(inside the cockpit) and less on the tasks to be completed externally (ATC & cabin). This is appropriate, however crews were 
often quick to break from their task/checklist/briefing to respond immediately to a call from FSS Radio or the Flight Attendant 
which could have waited until the checklist was completed. In most cases, FSS used the same phraseology, “Calm Air XXX, 
clearance when ready…”, indicating that the crew could respond at their convenience. As was documented in the Threat and 
Error sections of this report, crews responded to these interruptions in different ways; some re-ran checklists, while others 
finished off the Captain’s briefings or continued from where they left off.  
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Observer narratives also noted that there were times when both calls came within seconds of each other. In one case, the 
First Officer stopped the checklist and answered the radio call to accept a clearance. While the FO was writing the clearance, 
the Captain began dialing up the altitude preselector to the clearance altitude that he overheard on the radio. While the 
Captain was doing this, the intercom aural alert went off and the Captain responded to the FA’s “Cabin Secure” call. This all 
occurred within about 20 seconds, and the FO picked up the checklist and resumed from where he had left off.  
The crew on this particular flight did not make any errors, however the threats they encountered presented opportunities to 
misinterpret a clearance and not have it trapped by the other pilot or mis-set switches or systems due to an omitted checklist 
item. It is very difficult for FSS or the Flight Attendant to know if they are interrupting with a call to the flight crew, however 
the flight crew has the ability to defer/delay response if they are already engaged with an important task. Recognition of a 
crew’s vulnerability in this phase of flight is valuable, and more conscious pacing of tasks in anticipation of these interruptions 
could be encouraged. 
 
Low Error Detection Rates, High Failure to Respond Rates 
At first glance, the fact that 65% of errors went undetected by the Flight Crew may appear alarming. This rate reflects what 
the Observer group logged based on the context of the situation, and it is quite possible that the crew did not perceive their 
action/inaction as an error. 
As an example, a PF is hand-flying the aircraft and is at the same time making entries into the FMC; the PNF watches the PF 
make these selections, is aware of what is happening and does not intervene. The event happened, both pilots were aware, 
and because there was no negative outcome or additional error, the PNF felt no need to speak up. In this situation, the event 
would have been logged as a crew error to which the crew failed to respond. 
Similarly, a crew encounters a Master Caution – EFIS COMP (HDG) on the ATR. The crew is familiar with this caution as it 
commonly occurs, and the PNF pushes the ‘Master Caution’ button to silence the warning and the flight carries on as normal. 
The PNF does not annunciate the reason for the alert, the crew does not reference the QRH checklist associated with the 
fault. Due to conditioning and a normalization of deviance, the crew likely did not interpret this as an issue. Again, the 
Observer would have logged this as a crew error to which the crew failed to respond. 
LOSA categorizes an error as “an error” and treats an incorrectly set minimum descent altitude the same as a missed callout; 
severity is not considered. When given the context above, it’s understandable that at 65% undetected error rate is possible 
given flight crew norms and ‘SOP creep’. This may be supported by the 68% “failed to respond” crew response to errors – 
the crew did not perceive the event to be an error, and therefore they did not respond to it as an error by attempting to trap it. 
This should not suggest that this trend should be accepted by flight crews or the organization, but provides a context as to 
why these rates may be as high as they are. Efforts to clear up guidance to crews through SOPs and training events, as well 
as enforcement by Line Training Captains may see these rates reduce in tandem. 
 
Weaknesses within Fleet SOPs 
Crews responded strongly in the Crew Questionnaire when asked about SOPs. Similarly, the Steering Committee was left 
with several pages of notes at the end of the data verification process – these were notes from Observer narratives which 
identified SOP weaknesses, issues not accounted for, or guidance which was unclear. Further, they were situations where 
risk was elevated, but could not be attributed to any crew error. In this sense, a secondary outcome of the LOSA was a 
meaningful audit of the SOPs. 
There were, however, numerous events where crews made callout, cross verification or PF/PNF duty errors where specific 
guidance exists in company documentation and is trained at training events. It is possible to relate to a crew’s sense of 
familiarity with the operation, the aircraft, and in particular, the other pilots in the company. Depending on their positions in 
the seniority lists, many pilots see a lot of each other, and some (Bulk Fuel Pilots) are crewed together constantly. This 
familiarity can be an asset in one situation (communication, assertiveness) and can be a threat in another (complacency). 
Situations were observed where the PF was making entries in the FMC and hand-flying at the same time rather than asking 
the PNF to make the entry, where a new altitude is set in the preselector but is not confirmed by both pilots, or the altitude 
callouts are not made on approach. In most cases, there was a sense that both pilots were entirely aware of what was 
happening and safety was never compromised. 
In reviewing the crew data for this report, a relevant trend emerges. Of the 90 pilots on staff at the time of the LOSA, 70% 
had more than 5 years of service, and many have more than 10 years of service. In the last 10 years, the company has seen a 
reduction of the Hawker Siddely 748 fleet, the introduction of the ATR42 and subsequently the ATR72 fleets, the rapid 
retirement of the Saab 340 fleet, and introduction of the Dornier 328Jet. 
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Figure R: Calm Air Fleet History (2014) 
 
 
It is worthwhile to note that most pilots, and certainly most Captains, have experience on another aircraft type within the 
company. It should not be surprising that crews may revert to previous procedures or callouts of their previous aircraft, 
particularly if this was the first aircraft that they trained on when coming to the company – these would be familiar and 
habitual. If you combine this with areas where SOPs are silent on an issue or there is vague or unclear procedure, the “SOP 
creep” will begin and relocate to a ‘new’ normal where others begin to adopt the deviation as their own habit.  
While this may not be a serious issue for some crews, it can present a challenge for pilots who are new to the company. 
Having been trained in the flight simulator away from the operation under the guidance of an instructor who’s role it is to 
display and encourage SOP compliance and discipline, they are thrown an unexpected curve ball at a critical moment on 
landing when their Captain on the flight line calls “your pole” (SAAB 340) rather than the call “my aircraft” (ATR42) like they 
were trained and were expecting to hear. Many pilots likely recognize the deviation in their flying partner, though they may 
feel that addressing it will come at a cost to crew cohesiveness and opt not to. 
The callout, and cross-verification errors and the Crew Questionnaire responses earlier in this report support the trend. SOP 
improvements are required in these areas, and particularly in the area of PF/PNF duties with respect to automation 
management. Improvement in this area will require both timely and careful amendment to SOPs for clarity and application, 
followed by acceptance and disciplined, diligent use by Flight Crews on the line at every level. 
 
Unstable Approach Rate 
Unstable approaches are currently an industry hot-topic due to their connection with approach and landing accidents such as 
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and runway excursions, which account for 33% of all accidents (Flight Safety Foundation, 
2009). Unstable approaches are identified as the highest risk factor with respect to a runway excursion (Burin, 2011). 
Of particular concern to the industry and the source of recent research (Smith, Jameson, & Curtis, 2013) is the willingness of 
a crew to abandon their approach when outside of the published criteria and conduct a go around. The Flight Safety 
Foundation notes that the industry’s rate of unstable approaches is roughly 3.5% to 4%; for every 100 approaches flown, 3-4 
are flown outside of stabilized approach criteria. Furthermore, of all unstable approaches, 97% are flown to a landing; in only 
3% of unstable approaches are pilots conducting go-arounds, despite guidance to do so.  Smith, Jameson & Curtis (2013) 
relate the significance of these stats: 
“It can be argued, therefore, that the almost complete failure to call go-arounds as a preventive mitigation 
of the risk of continuing to fly approaches that are unstable constitutes the number one cause of runway 
excursions, and therefore of approach and landing accidents. If our go-around policies were effective even 
50 percent of the time, the industry accident rate would be reduced 10 to 18 percent. There is no other 
single decision, or procedure, beyond calling the go-around according to SOPs that could have as significant 
an effect in reducing our accident rate.” 
This LOSA observed 83 sectors over 10 weeks and logged 10 unstable approaches (UAs): Calm Air flew more than 4500 
sectors during the same period. This would put the LOSA UA rate was 12%. Statistically, our sample wasn’t large enough to 
say this with confidence, but it would relate to approximately 542 unstable approaches over that 10 week period (2800 per 
year). 
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Having said that, all approaches were logged based on the Calm Air policy that stabilized approach criteria must be met by 
1000 feet AGL in IMC or VMC conditions. If we were to apply the traditional Flight Safety Foundation stabilized approach 
criteria (1000ft AGL IMC, 500ft AGL VMC) we would only consider 5 of these approaches to have been unstable. That’s a 6% 
rate within LOSA observations and potentially 325 unstable approaches during the LOSA period (1690 per year). 
 
Table 45: Unstable Approach Rates 
 Industry 
(AeroSafety World) 
Calm Air LOSA 
2014 
Percentage of ALL Approaches  
Flown Outside of SA Criteria 3-4% 
6-12%  
(estimate) 
Percentage of Unstable Approaches where 
a Go-Around was Initiated 3% 0% 
 
Based on LOSA data, there is some degree of assurance that Calm Air falls within the industry norms with respect to 
unstable approaches. It is difficult to make this type of claim based on only 83 observations when many factors may influence 
an approach, such as the weather conditions, the time of day, or ATC influence. A Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
(FOQA) program with de-identified flight parameters regularly downloaded to a database directly from the aircraft would be 
helpful in achieving a higher level of safety assurance on this important issue. 
 
Communications with Other Departments 
LOSA provided individual narratives of flight sectors involving different crews, different aircraft and different routes, but 
collectively, they offered insight into how the operation runs, and how the different mechanisms of the organization operate 
together when they need to.  
The working relationship between Flight Crews and Maintenance Personnel was highlighted in several instances during the 
LOSA, and one event in particular sheds light on the issue. A crew arrived with an aircraft with a technical issue, and shared it 
verbally with the crew taking over the aircraft, rather than documenting it in the journey logbook or contacting Maintenance 
for guidance or troubleshooting. The incoming crew elected to contact Maintenance about the issue prior to departure, and an 
Engineer drove over to the airport terminal to assess the situation. The outcome was that the Engineer could not definitively 
diagnose the issue and would have to pull the aircraft offline and replace the unit, citing the downtime required and the cost 
of the part. The crew was left with that information to make a decision about taking the aircraft, which they did.  
The tone of the event reflects a strained working relationship: the flight crew may not want to ‘bother’ Maintenance for 
seemingly small or intermittent issues, and a Maintenance Engineer is being asked to assess an aircraft during a short 
window between flights with the outcome that they may have to take the aircraft out of service for a lengthy period to do so, 
impacting the flight schedule and passengers. While there may be no management level pressure to maintain schedule at the 
expense of aircraft serviceability, Flight Crews and Maintenance Engineers may be shouldering that pressure as implied 
expectations, and end up taking it out on each other. Efforts by the organization to communicate and understand each other’s 
roles and responsibilities, that Crews are required to write up defects in the journey logbook, and that Engineers are required 
to assess and address aircraft defects free from operational pressures, may improve this working relationship. 
Another working relationship which was observed was that between Flight Crews and Flight Dispatchers & Flight Operations 
Coordinators who work within the Calm Air System Operations Coordination Centre (SOCC). Crew Questionnaire responses 
revealed that Flight Crews were critical of Flight Dispatchers with respect to their expectations of Flight Dispatch. The Threat 
section of this report details several instances of flight planning errors. Having said this, there were also instances where the 
crew was surprised by their flight planned routing, though only detecting the issue once they received their clearance from 
ATC, suggesting that the route was on their operational flight plan, but was not detected. This would suggest that a review of 
briefing requirements/procedures/standards between Flight Crews and Flight Dispatchers may be beneficial, particularly when 
so much information is available to both parties, and most communication is done electronically (email). 
Finally, a single observation in the dataset which captured the outbound and return sectors of a charter flight could act as a 
case study of weaknesses in non-standard trip preparation. Crews encountered issues with crew scheduling (reporting time), 
lack of familiarity with the destination airport’s approaches and ATS hours of operation, were unclear about where to park and 
deliver passengers at the airport, and were challenged when the flight was assigned an RNAV arrival procedure back into 
Winnipeg and attempted to enter this information into the FMC. The narratives suggest that while Crews and Dispatchers 
may be very comfortable with operating within the normal area of operations, higher levels of briefing, preparation and 
awareness among all stakeholders would lead to better commercial and safety outcomes on these types of flights. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are offered as opportunities for improvement based on the analysis of LOSA data. They are 
written intentionally broad in scope to allow for more thoughtful implementation within the organization. 
1. Establish a “Standards Committee” for each aircraft type. Creating small teams that represent the flight crews 
operating that aircraft type will allow for more a formal evaluation and vetting process for amendments to SOPs and 
training programs before they are published to line crews. A set meeting schedule over the course of the year would 
allow for a more systematic and cyclical process for updating documents and incorporating feedback and 
suggestions from pilots who operate the aircraft. This also creates an environment for better conceived policies and 
procedures as well as improved buy-in on the flight line. 
2. Research the feasibility and implementation of a Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. FOQA 
(often also referred to as Flight Data Monitoring (FDM)) uses de-identified digital flight data that is downloaded from 
fleet aircraft to a database daily basis, and can be analyzed for trends and abnormal events. The program requires 
technical and equipment investments in the aircraft fleet, data collection, storage and analysis tools along with a 
formalized process with the pilot association for use. The value of the program is that it offers objective, aggregate 
data about how aircraft are being flown, which can offer a predictive safety component to the organization’s safety 
tools in addition to reactive and proactive safety processes. 
3. Review company stabilized approach criteria. Recent research on the reasons for pilots continuing unstable 
approaches to a landing has offered insights into how organizations can establish stabilized approach criteria related 
to their aircraft, operations and environment in an effort to mitigate risk. There were no go-arounds initiated in the 10 
unstable approaches observed in the Calm Air LOSA. A review of company criteria may result in redefining risks 
(resulting in fewer approaches categorized as unstable) and a more clear process for the PF/PNF to trigger a go 
around when criteria is not met. 
4. Review guidance for completing visual approach briefings. While instrument approach briefing expectations are 
quite clear and well-practiced by flight crews, a similarly clear expectation for visual approaches would lead to more 
comprehensive understanding between pilots in the cockpit. Suggested briefing formats may come from some of 
the pilots on the line who conduct these already as a personal ‘best practice’. 
5. Consider the syllabus and content of a “Captain Upgrade” course. An ‘Upgrade’ or ‘Command’ course can offer 
a more formalized introduction to organizational systems and expectations that Captains interact with. Traditionally, 
this familiarization has been accomplished through line indoctrination alone. Captains who are required to make 
decisions on behalf of the organization while out in the field deserve to have the best understanding about the 
reasoning behind policies and procedures and how operational functions (i.e.; Flight Dispatch, Flight Operations 
Coordination) and commercial efforts (i.e.; cargo) integrate into daily operations. A more formalized process of the 
above could help equip line Captains to be leaders by example at the highest levels. 
6. Explore the capability to standardize ATR fleet cockpit layout to the greatest extent possible. Because each 
aircraft in the fleet did not come to Calm Air directly from the manufacturer, most aircraft have minor variations to 
the arrangement and layout of equipment in the center pedestal due to service with previous operators. There are 
multiple arrangements of radio heads, FMCs, weather radar controls, etc which makes familiarity difficult, particularly 
in low light or in abnormal/emergency conditions. It is recognized that in certain cases, re-arrangement may not be 
practical or possible, however there may be an opportunity to re-arrange and standardize to a more common layout 
over time. This should be explored for feasibility. 
7. Expedite the authorization of RNAV approach procedures and training for ATR aircraft. The value of this  effort 
from an operational and a safety perspective cannot be over emphasized, and there is little argument from any 
stakeholder to that effect. 
8. Identify efforts to improve the working relationship with Maintenance Engineers. There are numerous factors 
which can affect this relationship, such as opportunities for face-to-face contact, understanding of the other person’s 
roles, responsibilities and priorities, and certainly personality. A recognition of the points where Pilots and Engineers 
come in to contact is important. Opportunities for joint training or ‘exchange’ visits (see Captain Upgrade course 
above) could be opportunities to accomplish this. 
9. Review processes involved for ad-hoc charter planning. There is an opportunity to formalize the planning and 
execution of non-standard flights which operate outside of the normal area of company operations. These should 
extend beyond charter flights and also apply to freighter and position flights. Recognition of the ways in which these 
flights are different – airspace, geography, weather, performance, communications, flight watch, ground support are 
key to assessing and mitigating risks to safety and compromises to customer expectations. 
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